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ABSTRACT
The objective of the research was to develop and validate a multifaceted model such as a fuzzy
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) model that considers both qualitative and quantitative
elements with relative significance in assessing the likelihood of falls and aid in the design of
NASA Ground Support Operations in aerospace environments. The model represented linguistic
variables that quantified significant risk factor levels. Multiple risk factors that contribute to falls
in NASA Ground Support Operations are task related, human/personal, environmental, and
organizational. Six subject matter experts were asked to participate in a voting system involving
a survey where they judge risk factors using the fundamental pairwise comparison scale. The
results were analyzed and synthesize using Expert Choice Software, which produced the relative
weights for the risk factors. The following are relative weights for these risk factors: Task
Related (0.314), Human/Personal (0.307), Environmental (0.248), and Organizational (0.130).
The overall inconsistency ratio for all risk factors was 0.07, which indicates the model results
were acceptable. The results show that task related risk factors are the highest cause for falls and
the organizational risk are the lowest cause for falls in NASA Ground Support Operations. The
multiple risk factors weights were validated by having two teams of subject matter experts create
priority vectors separately and confirm the weights are valid. The fuzzy AHP model usability
was utilizing fifteen subjects in a repeated measures analysis. The subjects were asked to
evaluate three scenarios in NASA KSC Ground Support Operations regarding various case
studies and historical data. The three scenarios were Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), Launch
Complex Payloads (LCP), and Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). The Kendall Coefficient of
iii

Concordance for assessment agreement between and within the subjects was 1.00. Therefore, the
appraisers are applying essentially the same standard when evaluating the scenarios. In addition,
a NASA subject matter expert was requested to evaluate the three scenarios also. The predicted
value was compared to accepted value. The results from the subject matter expert for the model
usability confirmed that the predicted value and accepted value for the likelihood rating were
similar. The percentage error for the three scenarios was 0%, 33%, 0% respectively. Multiple
descriptive statistics for a 95% confidence interval and t-test are the following: coefficient of
variation (21.36), variance (0.251), mean (2.34), and standard deviation (0.501). Model
validation was the guarantee of agreement with the NASA standard. Model validation process
was partitioned into three components: reliability, objectivity, and consistency. The model was
validated by comparing the fuzzy AHP model to NASA accepted model. The results indicate
there was minimal variability with fuzzy AHP modeling. As a result, the fuzzy AHP model is
confirmed valid. Future research includes developing fall protection guidelines.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Objectives of Study
A research study will be performed at a NASA/KSC to quantify and describe the
exposure-response relationships of the primary task-related, human/personal, organizational, and
environmental risk factors that contribute to falls. These relationships will be studied and
quantified utilizing methodologies.

Analysis of various job tasks within an aerospace

environment will allow for a comparison of different exposure levels to aid in quantifying the
exposure-response relationship for each primary risk factor. To accomplish this goal, the aim of
the research is to develop a quantifiable, aggregate approach for quantifying risk of falls by
considering broad categories of risk factors. The research objectives are:
1) Identify and classify risk factors that contribute to falls in an aerospace environment.
2) Develop a conceptual model that includes multiple risk factors that contribute to falls (i.e.
human/personal, task related, environmental, organizational)
3) Develop and validate a fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (AHP) model to predict the
likelihood of falls and aid in the design of work areas in NASA ground support
operations.
In closing, the intent of the research is to develop and validate the model to alleviate falls.
Significance of Research
As evidenced by the literature review presented in Chapter II, there is a significant
amount of research in the area of falls however; many of the exposure-response relationships are
ambiguous. This is mainly due to differences in exposure measurement techniques, differences
in research experimental designs, and unexamined interactions between the various risk factors.
1

Knowledge about risk factors leading to falls is essential for fall prevention (Hongwei Hsiao a;
Petre Simeonova, 2001). Specifically knowledge of extrinsic and intrinsic factors that contribute
to falls secure planning and occupational conditions for employers (Gauchard, G., 2001). Safety
of work systems needs a holistic approach because it is a combination of many factors that affect
the whole system simultaneously (Dagdeviren, M., 2008). The current literature is narrow and
the focus needs to be on the causation of workplace falls (Bentley, T., 2009). Therefore, there is
a need for research on preventing falls. Thus, this study will address a significant void in the
current knowledge base regarding the contributing risk factors that influence falls. The research
outcome is to develop a model that will identify, quantify, and validate risk factors that may lead
to falls and assist in the design of work environments specifically in an aerospace environment.
As result, it will be imperative to propose fall protection guidelines for the workplace.
Aerospace Environment
According to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Code,
Aerospace Environment such as NASA/KSC is a multi work environment because NASA
performs various industrial tasks such as roofing, construction, NASA ground support
operations, space shuttle/rocket operations, launch, and landing; which fall under many codes
(e.g. 927110 Space Research & Technology 4789-9902 Space flight operations). In fulfillment of
the overall vision for space exploration, NASA continues to explore answers that power the
future. NASA uniqueness regarding the Space Shuttle and Expendable Launch Vehicle missions
require full process of elements and hardware delivery to the International Space Station. NASA
Ground Support Operations is a component of an Aerospace Environment. At NASA/KSC,
many employees perform daily tasks from heights in Ground Support Operations. Performing
2

work from an elevation can be detrimental to the success of the vision and ultimately lead to the
risk of falls. The types of falls are same level falls and elevated falls. Same-Level Falls are
recurring but are less severe. Elevated Falls do not frequently occur, however they are brutal. Falls are

among the highest causes of injury and death at NASA/KSC and second only to vehicle
accidents as the leading cause of deaths. NASA has developed a fall protection class to educate
employees on workplace falls. Figure 1 below shows a United Space Alliance (USA) engineer, a
NASA contractor that participates in the fall protection training class.

Figure 1: Engineer at NASA/KSC Fall Protection Training Class
(NASA, 2005)
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Research Gaps
There are many gaps that need to be filled regarding fall prevention research. The research gaps
are as follow:
•

Knowledge and understanding of contributing risk factors that influence falls in NASA
Ground Support Operations ((Hongwei Hsiao, 2008; Petre Simeonova, 2001)

•

Aggregate impact and interactive nature of risk factors that influence falls (Gauchard, G.,
2001)

•

Model that quantifies risk factors that influence falls in an aerospace environment and
specifically NASA Ground Support Operations (Dagdeviren, M., 2008)

The research gaps will be addressed by the following research objectives in this study. Please see
Figure 2 below.

4

ResearchGaps

ResearchObjectives

Knowledgeand understandingof
contributing risk factors that influence
falls in NASAgroundsupport
operations (Hongwei Hsiao, 2008; Petre
Simeonova, 2001)

Identify andclassify risk factors that
influencefalls in an aerospace
environment
Develop aconceptual model that includes
multiplerisk factors that contribute to falls
(i.e. human/personal, task
related, environmental, organizational)

Aggregate impact of risk factors that
influencefalls and Interactive Natureof
Risk Factors (Gauchard, G., 2001)
Develop and validate afuzzy analytical
hierarchy process model to predict the
likelihood of falls in an aerospace
environment (NASAground support
operations) and aid in thedesign of work
areas.

Model that Quantifies risk factors
that influencefalls in NASA ground
support operations
(Dagdeviren, M., 2008)

Figure 2: Research Gaps and Objectives

Research Hypotheses

The following are the research hypotheses, which include the null and the alternative.
H0: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors can be useful
1

in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
H1: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors cannot be
useful in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
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H0: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model can be developed and validated to
2

predict the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
H1: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model cannot be developed and validated to
predict the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
Research Questions
1. What are the contributing risk factors that influence falls in the workplace?
2. How do we quantify contributing risk factors that influence falls in NASA ground
support operations?
3. What is the aggregate risk value of these risk factors on falls?
4. How we will predict the likelihood of falls?

What is a fall?

Figure 3: Universal Symbol for falls
(Bauer, 2006)
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A fall is defined as an event in which a person coming to rest unintentionally on the
ground or other lower level, not by the result of a major intrinsic event such as (stroke) or
overwhelming hazard (Tinetti, 1988). Falls are generally classified as an acute injury. Acute
injury is an injury which occurs immediately after exposure to a hazard. Falls are under the
umbrella of System Safety.
In the past, accident models came from operational safety and reflect on factors innately
while protecting workers against industrial accidents. Now, these various models were applied to
the complexity of work systems called system safety. System Safety is the application of
technical and management skills in a systematic approach to identify and control hazards
throughout a process or program.
Bureau of Labor Statistics
According to Bureau of Labor Statistics, falls are detrimental to the human body. There
are several case studies where the consequences of workplace falls lead to disabling body injury
or permanently bodily damage. As the human body hit a lower level, there is a sudden force to
the surface. As the result, the body is negatively impacted. Slips, trips, and falls are a major
cause of injuries and fatalities in the workplace. About 50% of the workplace injuries at
NASA/KSC are falls. According to the textbook, walking and working surfaces are surfaces or
devices on which people stand, walk, work, and climb that can cause many accidents. The
following diagram shows the number of human body parts affected as result of falls.

7

11,560
130
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2,360

13,290
3,610

35,880

9,140

9,140

Figure 4: Total Falls on Human Body
(BLS, 2005)
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According to BLS, the following table shows that falls (13%) are the second only to highway
Fatalities (25%) regarding workplace deaths.
Table 1: BLS Statistics
(BLS, 2005)

According to BLS, falls to a lower level is approximately 86 % of all Fall Fatalities. The falls
categories are: Fall from ladder, fall from roof, and fall from scaffold.
Table 2: BLS Fall Statistics
(BLS, 2005)
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The following figure shows the sources of the most fatal falls. The area that constitutes
the most fatal falls are roofing at 36% of all falls. For example, in NASA Ground Support
Operations, roofing is high area of concern for fall hazards. Another area of concern is
scaffolding, which 17% of all falls. As a result, NASA is offering a fall protection course in
scaffolding at Kennedy Space Center.

Non-moving
Vehicles 5%

Other 20%

Floors,
Loading
Docks,
Ground Level
1%

Roofs 36%

Structural
Steel 4%
Ladders 17%

Scaffolds
17%

Figure 5: Fatal Falls
(BLS, 2004)
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Contribution and Benefits of this research

This dissertation research will offer a contribution to field of fall protection of NASA
Safety program. The fuzzy AHP model will be a great asset to the plethora of risk assessment
literature and fall prevention studies because it provides granularity and gives insight regarding
the fall risks. The contribution to the field of study is the utilization of the valid fuzzy AHP
model to predict the likelihood of falls. The model is universal can be applied in any work
environment. The benefit of this research will be the application of this model to a safety and risk
management course at NASA/KSC.

Overview of Gravitec Study
There are KSC environments where employees are required to perform tasks from
various fall distances. To address the issue NASA contracted with Gravitec Systems Inc., a
fall-protection engineering firm, who surveyed over 400 elevated work areas and gathered
contractor input with respect to fall hazards. Facility maintenance, Space Shuttle operations,
payloads, cranes, construction and roofing are areas of concern for fall hazards. A hazard
ranking system was developed based on factors that were considered easily measurable,
highly relevant, and quantifiable. This ranking system is limited and it fails to include human
factors, uncontrollable environmental factors, and working conditions in the evaluation of the
workplace. Thus, there is a need for the proposed research.

11

Influence of Gravitec Study on my research
It was assumed in NASA Gravitec ranking system that multiple risk factors had a
uniform influence on falls. The survey goals were to standardize fall protection programs, abate
fall hazards across the center, identify existing facilities requiring fall protection systems,
establish a baseline current fall protection methods status and benchmark KSC against the fall
Protection industry. However, the purpose of this research is to develop and validate model to
fulfill these goals. This research portrays the implementation of broad-scale prevention model
that can significantly reduce fall injury claims.

Theoretical Framework
A theoretical framework is basically a conceptual model of how one makes logical sense
of the relationships among several factors that have been identified as important to the problem.
A typical theoretical framework provides a schematic description of relationships between and
among independent, dependent, control, and extraneous variables so that a reader can easily
comprehend the theorized relationships. What multiple risk factors lead to falls? How to predict
the likelihood of falls? Figure 6 is the ergonomics model presented in Bentley’s study. The
model is about an information processing approach to the role of latent and active failures in
workplace regarding slips, trips, and falls. Figure 6 shows that Latent Failures are extrinsic
factors and Active Failures are intrinsic factors.

12

Figure 6: Theoretical Framework Model
(Bentley, T., 2009)
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Scope and Limitations of the Study
The scope of this research will be limited to addressing the primary risk factors such as
task related (i.e. load handling/carrying, task duration, posture), human/personal (i.e. age, gender,
slip/trip, behavior), organizational (i.e. safety culture/climate, job safety and risk training,
production pressure) and environmental (i.e. poor lighting, ladder regulation, coefficient of
friction) that lead to falls. Also, the interaction of multiple risk factors will not be investigated.
This is reserved for future studies. While other factors have been identified that influence falls,
many of these factors are often present in combination with the primary risk factors explored in
this research. The research will investigate the likelihood of falls in an aerospace environment
and particularly NASA ground support operations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the research will focus primarily on multiple risk factors that contribute to
falls in an aerospace environment. The research will emphasize the importance of system safety
with respect to falls and concentrate on interdependence of falls. Ultimately, the result of the
research is a methodical examination for fall prevention that lead will to fall protection
guidelines.

14

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
To formulate the conceptual and quantitative model development, a comprehensive
literature review was conducted. One objective of the literature review was to understand the
previous approaches and methods taken by other researchers and thereby identify any gaps in the
field.
The literature review will discuss the following topics:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Description of falls
Anatomy of a fall
Impact of falls on industry and workers
Studies that identified risk factors for falls
Studies by industry
Approaches to mitigate falls
Fuzzy models in risk assessment
Models and Tools for assessing risks and falls
Literature Review Summary
Description of falls
Slips, trips and falls are one of the most common causes of injuries and fatalities in the

general community (BLS, 2005). The first step to fall prevention is to have cognizance and
knowledge of fall etiology. Etiology is origin or cause of an abnormal condition, disease, or
injury. Slips and trips are more than just a trivial problem (Maynard, 2002) in the workplace.
The control of such incidents involves a complex array of factors. Falls are caused by a slip and
trip (Davis, 1983 and Lipscomb, 2006), extrinsic and intrinsic factors (Gauchard, 2001), surface
area and footwear (Hanson, 1999). Several fall injuries and fatalities originate multiple risk
factors. The intrinsic risk factors among others are physical, behavioral, and apparel. The
15

extrinsic factors include the working surface and managerial factors. The risk factors that
increase the severity of fall accidents result from factors such as physical tolerance of bones,
body stamina, and harmful materials (Hsiao, 2008).
The main consequences of falls are sprains and fractures (Manning, 1983) that can lead to
work interruption due to disability, the length of which varies with age (Kemmlert and
Lundholm, 1998), and can have detrimental economic repercussions for the employer. The study
of slips and falls are complex, and involves various sciences and disciplines including
ergonomics, biomechanics, psychology, and tribology (Maynard, 2002). Biomechanics is the
analysis of how individuals walk and surface interface as they walk. Psychology is the
perception and response to slippery conditions. Tribology is the study of interaction of sliding
surfaces and from the Greek language, “tribos,” which means rubbing. It is linked to friction
between footwear sole and floor surface. It is imperative to consider the environmental surface
and environmental conditions in order to mitigate falls. Multiple factors that contribute to falls
are Human/Personal Factors (Davis, 1983), Environmental Factors (Hanson 1999, Hignet and
Masud, 2006), Environmental Factors, and Organizational Factors (Gauchard, 2001 and
Lipscomb 2006), and Task Related Factors (Maynard, 2002 and Gauchard, 2001).
A fall sequence involves the following steps: occurrence of imbalance such as slip or trip,
attempt to recover equilibrium or in case of recovery failure, a fall occurs when the body impacts
the surface (Gauchard, 2001). The fall sequence is based on prioprioception in the human body.
Prioprioception is an automatic sensitivity mechanism in the body that sends messages through
the central nervous system (CNS). Prioprioception is the ability to sense the position, location,
orientation, and movement of the human body.
16

Anatomy of a fall
The anatomy of a fall is the sudden, unanticipated descent in space driven by gravity. The
consequences are often permanently disabling or even deadly. It takes most people about 1/3
of a second to become aware. It takes another 1/3 of a second for the body to react. A body
can fall up to 7 feet in 2/3 of a second. It is essential to understand the detailed analysis for
the anatomy of a fall in order to prevent and mitigate falls.

.33 second/2 feet
.67 second/7 feet

1 second/16 feet

2 second/64 feet
Figure 7: Anatomy of a fall
(BLS, 2004)
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Impact of falls on industry and workers
Work-related falls from heights remain a significant problem for workers in industry. An
extensive literature review identified a number of environmental, task-related, and personal
factors that degrade the control of balance and cause falls. These factors include visual exposure
to elevation, unstable visual cues, visual impairment, confined and inclined support surfaces,
unexpected changes in working surface, load handling/coupling, physical exertion, fatigue,
personal differences, task complexity, work experience, training, and the proper use of personal
protective equipment (PPE). In many instances, these procedures are not practical for the
industry and current regulations allow the use of alternative means of fall protection, such as
slide guards. The prevention of falls should consider the main effects and interactions of the
environmental factors, task-related factors, and personal factors that affect the balance control of
workers. After the model development and validation, the multiple risk factors that influence
falls will also be examined to prevent falls.

Studies that identified risk factors for falls
There are several factors that contribute to task performance such as age, weight, height,
foot size, gender, sex or even race may contribute to a fall. The other factors that are involved in
task performance are locomotors, visual factors, and fatigue affects (Davis, 1983) that lead to
falls. It attempts to prevent injuries and illnesses by reducing or eliminating human exposure to
occupational hazards. In addition, it seeks to improve the match between the job and worker’s
physical abilities, information management, and workload capacities.
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A literature review has shown that multiple risk factors lead to falls. These risk factors can be
broadly categorized as:
•
•
•

•

Task Factors are factors related to the job, occupation, or workplace.
Environmental Factors are extrinsic influences or factors from the surrounding systems
that affect growth and development.
Human/Personal Factors are characteristics and intrinsic factors related to the
psychological, social, physical, biological, and safety characteristics of a user and the
system the user is in.
Organizational Factors are characteristics regarding safety climate and culture of the
company, business, or association.

Factors that affect safety, health, and may influence falls
The objective of the research is to identify the various factors influencing safety in the
workplace (Sawacha, E., 1999). The health and safety of individuals are influenced by factors
such as environmental, human, task, and organizational. The impacts of human, economical,
psychological, technical, procedural, organizational, and the environmental issues are considered
in terms of how these factors are linked with the level of safety. The human factor is
characterized by the background and characteristics of the individual, such as age and
experience. The economic factor is determined by the monetary values which are associated with
safety such as, hazard pay. The psychological factor is assessed by the safety behavior of fellow
workers on site including supervisors. The technical and procedural factors are assessed by the
provision of training and handling of safety equipment on site.
The organizational and environmental factors are portrayed as the type of policy that the
management adapts to the specific site safety. Information regarding these factors was correlated
with accidents' records in a sample of 120 operatives. Results of the factor analysis suggest that
variables related to the ‘organization policy' are the most dominant group of factors influencing
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safety performance in the United Kingdom Construction Industry (Sawacha et al., 1999). The
following table portrays various risk factors that affect safety, health, and could possibly lead to
falls.
Factors affecting health and safety at work
Table 3: Risk Factors affecting safety and health
(Sawacha et al., 1999)
Environmental Factors
1. Heating: heat stroke, cramps, low temperature
2. Poor lighting: headache, eye strains
3. Dust: Pneumoconiosis, silicosis
4. Noise: deafness, affects concentration
Occupational Factors
1. Butchers and carpenters - risk of cutting
2. Cleaners and food handlers - risk of contact dermatitis
3. Store keepers and health careers - risk of back strain
Note: When hazards are not obvious for certain jobs the risks are still there.
Human Factors
1. Need for proper training and supervision
2. Risk to health and safety - untrained, unwell, carelessness
3. Employees - responsible for own behavior
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Environmental Factors
The objective of the study is to examine the characteristics of patient falls during
hospitalization in 1998 and compare them with those in the period 1978-1981 (Kerzman et al.,
2004). The occurrence of patient falls in a hospital environment is a major concern in any health
care system. Research findings have reported the risk factors for these falls are age, gender,
certain medications, mental status, chronic diseases, and environmental factors. Falls may lead to
fear, pain, slight or severe injuries, increase the duration of hospital stay, cause patient
discomfort, and affect quality of life. A retrospective study was performed in a large, 2000-bed
medical center in Israel. Reports of 711 fall incidents in 1998 were compared with 328 reports in
1978-1981. Information gathered included age, gender, department, work schedules, severity of
injury, tests and treatment after injury. This information is used a risk factors to used in a tool for
fall mitigation. The results showed that the rates of falls per 1000 admissions in psychiatric, elder
care and rehabilitation departments in 1998 were significantly higher than in the earlier period.
Rates of 115, 91, 85, respectively, per 1000 admissions were reported in 1998 compared with 34,
9, 19, respectively, in the period 1978-1981. The percentage of reported falls in the younger age
group (under 50) was higher in the later survey (1998), and a higher proportion occurred outside
the patient's room. Most of the reported falls in 1998 occurred during the morning shift. In
conclusion, the increased number of falls could be an outcome of increased environmental
awareness (Kerzman et al, 2004).
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Human Factors
Age is a human factor that that may lead to falls. Falling itself is not a diagnosis but a
symptom of multiple risk factors and the effect of certain medications of homeostasis and
environmental hazards that hinder safe mobility. Preventing falls requires a systematic diagnostic
approach focused on identifying and reducing risk factors. Specific preventive strategies include
treating underlying medical conditions, establishing a risk assessment, prescribing an exercise
program to improve mobility, or removing fall hazards in the workplace (Tideikssar, R., 1996).
Human factors included age, gender, experience, and the use of personal protective
equipment (PPE). Accident scenarios were extracted from accident reporting system. Scenarios
in NASA Ground Support Operations A trend was found between causes for the falls and
accident events. Falls from scaffold staging were associated with a lack of complying scaffolds
and bodily action. Falls through existing floor openings were associated with unguarded
openings, inappropriate protections, or the removal of protections. Falls from building girders or
other structural steel were associated with bodily actions and improper use of PPE. Falls from
ladders were associated with overexertion and unusual control of tools. Falls down stairs were
associated with unguarded openings. Falls while jumping to a lower floor and falls through
existing roof openings were associated with poor work practices. Primary and secondary
prevention measures can be used to prevent falls or to mitigate the consequences of falls and are
suggested for each type of accident. Primary prevention measures would include fixed barriers,
such as handrails, guardrails, surface opening protections, and strong roofing materials. As a
result, protection measures would include travel restraint systems, fall arrest systems, and fall
containment systems (Chi et al., 2005).
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Human factors research in other high-risk fields such as patient care has demonstrated the
rigorous study of risk factors effect on task performance. The research can lead to improved
outcome and reduced errors after redesign system of tasks. These methods have been applied to
the anesthesia work environment. The data obtained in the experiment utilize task analysis,
workload assessment during actual patient care, and the use of cognitive task analysis to study
clinical decision making. A novel concept of "non-routine events" is introduced and pilot data
are presented. In concluding, the awareness of human factors that affect system safety and falls
can lead to fall mitigation.
Organizational Factors
Managing Dynamic Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) and maintaining a safe environment
must be simultaneous efforts to produce a successful organization. The objective of the NPP
study was to develop a system dynamics model to assess the organizational and human factors
which contribute to nuclear safety. The dynamic model portrays cause and effect relationships
among factors and quantifies these factors. The variables in the model are degree of leadership,
human resources, number of employees, workload and not just hardware in each department. The
universal user can simulate various situations in nuclear power plant organization. The
simulation is so intuitive that it assists with the improvements to safety and provides managerial
tools for the organizational and human factors. In concluding, the model can portray how
organizational and management policies affect individual performance such as productivity,
quality of work, and ultimately NPP safety (Ahn, N., Jae, M., Yu, J., 2004).
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System Safety
The NPP environment is very similar to NASA environment. Both organizations are
dynamic because of the type of tasks that need to accomplish. Safety is very important to both
organizations. The work environments are characterized by continuous change, progress, and
activity. For example, at NASA Ground Support Operations, there are several workers involved
to complete a task. These human factors can lead to falls because the demand is high and supply
is low. These kinds of organizations are schedule driven and leadership influenced.
System Safety refers to the extent to which individuals and group will commit to personal
responsibility for safety, learn from mistakes, modify behavior, and be rewarded in these efforts.
Safety Climate,” is the temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to commonalities among
individual perceptions of the organization.” It refers to the perception about safety at a particular
place and time. The climate is subject to change depending on the current environment.
The NASA Agency and the organizational structure are dynamic. System safety includes
the total range of risk management. High risks are detrimental to NASA success. When
considering communication and leadership, it was stated, “In an interview shortly after he
became Center Director at KSC, Jim Kennedy suggested that most important cultural issue the
Shuttle program is establishing a feeling of openness and honesty with all employees where
everybody’s voice is valued (CAIB, ibid, p. 108).” NASA employees need to feel secure about
reporting concerns and taking the appropriate action. Ultimately, employees should be given
respect. There is a gap between vision and reality. The first priority at NASA is safety. However,
the operational practices have deviated from the standards due to political stress, social factors,
cultural factors, and organizational factors. Each center, program, projects, group, division, and
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various engineering disciplines have their own subculture. This may negatively impact the
overall culture of the organization. “If eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, then chronic
unease is the price of safety." stated James Reason, Managing the Risk of Organizational
Accidents (Leveson, N., 2004).
Safety risk: NASA Scorecard
The NASA Safety Risk Scorecard is a tool to assess risks at NASA. The NASA risk
scorecard includes a 5 x 5 matrix in Figure 29. The research involves assessing risk factors that
lead to falls in NASA ground support operations. Falls are part of system safety at NASA. The
NASA Safety scorecard will be conveyed and compared to the fuzzy AHP model in this
research. Showing a correlation between the fuzzy AHP model and the NASA Safety Risk
scorecard is the quantitative approach to the research. The fuzzy AHP model and the NASA risk
Scorecard has five levels associated with the risk assessment.
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Table 4: Risk Factors affecting the organization
(Ahn et al., 2004)
Level of Hierarchy

Attributes

Top Managers

Attitude Leadership Morale

Middle Managers

Attitude

Organizational Culture

Staff Capacity

Plant Condition

Workload

Number of MM

Productivity

Number of Defects

Spent time to dealt
with work

Education Etc.

Quality of work

Defect generation rate

Administration task

Employees

Skill level

Parts

Maintenance task

(Operation Engineering Maintenance Coordination)

Spent time to dispose of task

Etc.

Etc.

Supervision
Time allocation
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Task Factors
Task-delineated safety (TDS) is a behavior-based safety management program developed
in order to address the significant problems of slip, trip and fall accidents (Quintana, R, 1999).
The hypothesis of this approach is that hazards can be minimized if personnel are held directly
accountable with clear task delineation for keeping an area safe. Role ambiguity would be
minimized which lead to a safe environment. Management's role in providing feedback and
enforcement is imperative to the success of the safety management program. This hypothesis was
analyzed by focusing on slip, trip and fall hazards at used-clothes sorting facility, with a history
of slip, trip and fall accidents costing the company approximately two million US dollars in the
past 3 years. The slip, trip and fall hazard density was significantly lower using this TDS
approach (Quintana, R., 1999).
There are some implications in the literature regarding risk factors that contribute to falls.
A faulty assumption is if a worker slips or trips, they will automatically fall. This is not always
the case. According to the literature, the premise is that a cause of fall is a slip and trip. However,
a fallacy is that slips, trips, and falls are in the same category, have similar causes and effects,
and can be mitigated in the same manner. According to literature and technical reports, each
incident is different and should be treated accordingly.
The following table contains multiple risk factors that contribute to the falls in General
work environment and specifically in the aerospace environment. The following risk factors
were observed multiple times (reoccurrence or three or more) in the literature. According to the
literature, the following table contains significant risk factors that lead to falls. The studies show
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there are multiple sources for falls. It has been observed that causes for falls are dependent on the
work environment. There similar trends and information in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Data, Liberty Mutual Data, Mishap Data, Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS),
Empirical Studies, and NASA/Gravitec Fall Hazard Analysis Report. A general concern is a
combination of the risk factors that contribute to falls. Table 5 is a comparative analysis of
multiple risk factors that contribute to falls in the workplace. The list is not conclusive but it is a
sample of the many risk factors that contribute to falls.
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Table 5: Multiple risk factors that contribute to falls

General Work Environment

Aerospace Environment (NASA Ground
Support Operations)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Experience (OF)
Job and Safety
Program (OF)
Type of
Task/Activity (TF)
Sex/Gender (HF)
Load weight (TF)
Environmental
Conditions (EF)
Task Duration (TF)
Slip and Trip (HF)
Environmental
Surface (EF)
Slip and Trip (HF)
Poor Lighting (EF)
Day of the week
(EF)
Occupation/Industry
sector (OF)
Coefficient of
Friction (EF)
Time of Day for the
fall (EF)
Coefficient of
Friction (EF)
Fall Distance (EF)
Age (HF)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Worker Interference
(HF)
Number of Workers
(HF)
Age (HF)
Fall Distance (EF)
Environmental
Conditions (EF)
Environmental Surface
(EF)
Task Duration (TF)
Task Frequency (TF)
Task Proximity (TF)
Fall Hazard Severity
(OF)
Fall Hazard Protection
(OF)
Fall Hazard Occurrence
(OF)

Legend
OF-Organizational Factor
EF-Environmental Factor
TF-Task Related Factor
HF-Human/Personal Factor
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The focus of this research will be on multiple risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA
Ground Support Operations. The following are the multiple risk factors that lead to falls in a
dynamic aerospace environment. The benchmark for risk factor selection was by strategically
observing three or more occurrences of the each risk factor in the NASA Fall Hazard Report and
NASA Mishap Data. The following are the risk factors’ definitions that contribute to falls in
NASA Ground Support Operations.
Human/Personal Factors
•

Worker Interference: the effect multiple workers at the same location have on each other
and the interference of each worker's movements in the work environment.

•

Number of workers: the number of workers at the location

•

Age: the (average) age of the workers at the location

Environmental Factors
•

Fall Distance: height of fall

•

Environmental Surface: the security of the platform, structure, or surface that
supports the worker

• Environmental Conditions: measurement of work being performed in an inside or outside
work environment
Organizational Factors
•

Fall Hazard Severity: severity and consequence of the fall hazard that is related to the
height of the fall in the organization being analyzed

•

Fall Hazard Protection: measurement of the existing fall protection quality at the
facility/organization being analyzed
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•

Fall Hazard Occurrence: how often the particular fall hazard is found at the
facility/organization being analyzed

Task Factors
•

Task Frequency: how frequently workers perform the task and exposed to a fall hazard

•

Task Duration: how long workers spend at the location performing the task and the
number of man hours exposed to the fall hazard

•

Task Proximity: measurement of how close the workers normally get to the fall hazard
while performing the task
The Ishikawa “Fishbone” Diagram was used as the conceptual model to represent falls.

The following conceptual model is a graphic tool that helps identify, sort, and display possible
causes of a problem or quality characteristic. The cause and effect diagram display the number of
errors for the various risk factors that contribute to falls. There are extrinsic and intrinsic factors
that contribute to falls. Extrinsic factors are characteristics from the outside. Intrinsic factors are
original causes and characteristics within the human body.

The extrinsic factors are

organizational and environmental. The intrinsic factors are human/personal and task related.
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Conceptual Model

Environmental Factors
Fall Distance
Environmental Surface

Organizational Factors

Fall Hazard Protection

Fall Hazard Severity
Extrinsic Factors

Environmental Conditions
Fall Hazard Occurrence

Worker Interference

Task Frequency

Falls

Number of Workers
Task Duration
Age
Intrinsic Factors

Task Proximity

Task Related Factors

Human/Personal Factors

Figure 8: Conceptual Model
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Fall Studies by industry
Falls in Healthcare
The objective of the study is to examine how risk factors influence the satisfaction,
health, safety, and well-being of health care workers (Lundstrom et al., 2002). Ultimately, these
factors affect the satisfaction, safety, and quality of care for patients. In addition, the impact of
the work environment on tasks and the effects on health care workers and patients. Studies have
shown where falls are major concern in healthcare because medical facilities are dynamic work
environments just like an aerospace environment. Therefore, people are performing high risk
tasks such as doctors and nurses handling and lifting disabled patients. Studies focusing on
worker health and safety concerns affected by the organization and the physical work
environment provide evidence of direct positive and/or adverse effects on performance and
suggest indirect effects on the quality of patient care. An increasing number of studies are
reviewing the relationship between improvement in organizational factors and changes in patient
outcomes. Characteristics or risks in hospitals are observed as one model for improving safety. In
conclusion, the observance of characteristics of fall is important to fall mitigation (Lundstrom et
al., 2002).
Falls in the construction industry
Fall-related occupational injuries and fatalities are a major problem in the U.S.
construction industry. Two Bureau of Labor Statistics databases-Censuses of Fatal Occupational
Injuries and Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses-were examined for 1992-2000. A total
of 605 fall-through fatalities occurred during 1992-2000. The costs estimates were in a range of
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$55,000-$76,000 for the total cost of a 1998 fall injuries. Current work practices and fall
protection equipment have reduced the frequency and costs of fall-through incidents.
Researchers can use a systems approach on these incidents to identify contributing risk factors.
Employers and practitioners can alert managers and work crews about these dangerous locations
to eliminate the fall hazards that are often obvious and easy to rectify (Bobick, T., 2004).
The construction industry is highly subject to occupational accidents. In Norway there is
little research-based knowledge on accident pattern and risk factors (Gravseth, et al., 2006). The
main objective of the study was to examine studies of accidents in this industry, leading to
injuries registered by the health services, could identify preventable risk factors and preventive
measures. Fifty accidents in the construction industry led to serious personal injuries. Patients
were interviewed after treatment in emergency wards and hospitals. Inspections of the accident
sites were performed. Subject matter experts (SMEs) discussed the accidents in order to identify
risk factors and suggest preventive measures. The accident reports in the study were compared to
reports from the Labor Inspectorate on the same accidents. The investigation identified several
risk factors. Several detailed preventive measures were proposed. Results showed that more than
one third of the respondents said that time pressure had contributed to the accident. Accident risk
caused by time pressure can be reduced by avoiding fragmented contracts, unrealistic time limits,
and the use of day penalties for breach of contract. Possible preventive measures for electric
injuries imply modification of the reporting system and of the work organization so that workers
can comply with the regulations more easily (Gravseth et al., 2006).
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigate most workerrelated fatalities. A research study was conducted that focused on the data OSHA accumulated
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on construction worker accidents involving falls. In the construction industry, falls are the major
sources of accidents resulting in fatalities (Huang et al., 2003). The purpose of the study was to
identify the root causes of fall accidents and to identify any additional information that might be
helpful in reducing the incidence of construction worker falls in the future. Data used in the
study was from January 1990 through October 2001. However, the last 5 years of this time
interval was important because this is a period when more data was accumulated and recorded in
the OSHA investigation reports. Results show that most fall accidents take place at elevations of
less than 9.15 m (30 ft), occurring primarily on new construction projects of commercial
buildings and residential projects of relatively low construction cost. In addition, experience does
not seem to diminish accident occurrence. Workers often misjudge fall hazards. Most of all, the
results show that fall accidents account for a growing proportion of the total number of
construction worker fatalities (Huang X. and Hinze, J., 2003).
The purpose of the study was to develop a method to evaluate the relationship between
slip resistance measurements and slips and falls (Hanson et al, 1999). The prediction of falls was
based on the surface area. There were five subjects wearing a safety harnesses walked down a
ramp at various angles such as 0º, 10º, and 20º. The different surface areas were tile or carpeted
surface under dry, wet, or soapy conditions. The coefficient of friction of footwear, floor surface,
and contaminant interfaces were measured. The friction was assessed by examining the foot
forces during walking trials when no slips occurred. The results showed that the number of slip
and fall incidents increased as the difference between the required coefficient of friction (COF)
and the measured dynamic coefficient of friction increased. The developed regression model was
developed to show the significant factors contributing to slips and falls. This type of model can
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be used to evaluate various work environments and assist in the design of safer work
environments (Hanson et al., 1999).
Figure 9 is the adjustable platform used to set the ramp angle known as the optical data
collection trigger (ODCT). The subject is wearing a harness system to prevent fall injury during
the experiment. A video camera was used to capture the motion of the markers on the foot.

Figure 9: Coefficient of Friction
(Hanson et al., 1999)
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The purpose of the study was to identify the factors that contribute to slips, trips, and falls
occurring during the delivery of mail. Previous analysis of data consists of approximately 1700
fall incidents. About one-fifth of falls occurred on steps. The experimental methods include
interviews with safety management, group discussion with delivery employees, and survey for
employee and managers. The results showed that risk factors related to task, behavior, footwear,
and equipment contribute to falls. In addition, working practices such as reading the mailing
address while walking caused falls. Figure 10 shows that some of the organizational factors that
contribute to falls were management safety activities, adverse weather conditions, management
factors, employee training, and equipment provision (Bentley, T., 1998).
.

Figure 10: Fall Risk factors during Mail Delivery
(Bentley et al, 1998)
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Falls cause important and financial costs, as regards workers (Leamon and Murphy,
1995). The mechanism of a fall can be described as follows: imbalance (slips, trips, etc.), attempt
at equilibrium recovery and, in the event of failure, fall with eventual injuries (Leclercq, 1997).
Falls are reoccurring occupational incidents in the workplace.
The falls lead to imperative social and economic issues for the employee and employer.
Various factors such as environmental and personal factors that affect the balance control of an
individual. The factors involved in the study focus on environmental, task, and personal. Having
knowledge of intrinsic and extrinsic factors contributing to falls could be beneficial to
environmental plan, safer occupational conditions for employees and use of balance
rehabilitation procedures to reduce fall hazards (Gauchard et al., 2001).

Fall Hazards in the aircraft maintenance industry
Falls are significant occupational hazards, particularly in industries with dynamic work
environments. The following study describes rates of noncompliance with fall hazard prevention
requirements, perceived safety climate, employee knowledge, beliefs, and the association
between fall exposure and safety climate measures in commercial aircraft maintenance activities.
The method includes walkthrough observations on aircraft mechanics at two participating sites.
The methods involve asserting the degree of noncompliance and completing questionnaires
concerning fall hazard knowledge, personal safety beliefs, and safety climate. The survey results
were summarized into safety climate and belief scores by workgroup and site. Noncompliance
rates observed during walkthroughs were compared to the climate-belief scores, and were
expected to be inversely proportional. As a result, important differences were seen in fall safety
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performance between the sites. The study provided a characterization of aircraft maintenance fall
hazards. Noncompliance varied by height, equipment used, location of work on the aircraft, shift,
and by safety system. Employees with higher safety climate scores had greater observed
noncompliance within each site. Ultimately, the use of engineered safety systems had a
significant impact on working safely. The results of this study indicated that safety systems are
very important in reducing noncompliance with fall protection requirements in aircraft
maintenance facilities. Site-level fall safety compliance was found to be related to safety climate
(Nietzel et al., 2008).

Approaches to mitigate falls
The purpose of this perspective article is to describe the use of a physiological profile
approach to falls risk assessment and prevention that has been developed by the Falls and
Balance Research Group of the Prince of Wales Medical Research Institute, Sydney, Australia
(Lord, S., 2003). The profile’s use for people with a variety of factors that put them at risk for
falls is discussed. The Physiological Profile Assessment (PPA) involves a series of simple tests
of vision, peripheral sensation, muscle force, reaction time, and postural sway. The tests can be
administered with the proper portable equipment. The results can be used to differentiate people
who are at risk for falls (“fallers”) from people who are not at risk for falls (“nonfallers”). A
computer program using data from the PPA can be used to assess an individual’s performance in
relation to a normative database so that deficits can be targeted for intervention. The PPA
provides valid, numerical, and reliable measurements that can be used for assessing falls risk and
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evaluating the effectiveness of interventions and is suitable for use in a range of physical therapy
and health care settings (Lord et al., 2003).

Figure 11: Physiological Profile Assessment
(Lord et al., 2003)
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The following risk graph is for a 79 year old woman. It is confirmed that for a 79 year old
woman, the fall risk is mild. The normal age range is 20 to 99 years. The graphs shows that falls
are the effect (y) and age is the cause (x). Therefore, falls are dependent on age. The PPA output
is the following: graph of the overall risk score, profile of the individual’s test performances,
table of the test performances versus age, and the written report containing results and
recommendations.

Figure 12: Fall Risk versus Age
(Lord, S et al, 2003)
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Fuzzy Models in Risk Assessment

The objective of the research was to develop a fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (AHP)
model for behavior-based safety management. Safety management (SM) is a very important
element within an effective manufacturing organization. One of the most important components
of SM is to maintain the safety of work systems in the workplace. Safety of work systems is a
function of many factors which affect the system. Numerous factors affect the safety of work
systems simultaneously. As a result, measuring work system safety needs a comprehensive
approach. In this study, the work safety issue is studied through the analytic hierarchy process
(AHP) approach which allows both multi-faceted and simultaneous assessment. The real
problem can be represented in a more compatible way by using fuzzy numbers instead of crisp
numbers to evaluate the risk factors. A fuzzy AHP approach is proposed to determine the level of
faulty behavior risk (FBR) in work systems. The proposed method is applied in a real
manufacturing company. Risk factors causing faulty behavior are weighted with triangular fuzzy
numbers in pairwise comparisons. The risk factors are evaluated based on the work system by
using the relative weights and fuzzy linguistic variables. As a result of this evaluation, FBR
levels of work systems are determined. Finally, faulty behavior is prevented before occurrence
and work system safety is improved (Dagdeviren, M., 2008).
The object of the study was the development of the global economy and the ease of air
transportation have flight safety (Hsia, T., 2008). There are exact specifications and procedures
in the operation and maintenance of aircraft. Human errors and mechanical disorders are two key
risk factors of flight safety. The employees need to follow an outlined procedure to avoid human
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errors and ensure flight safety. Readability of aircraft maintenance technical orders can affect the
quality and reliability of aircraft maintenance. To ensure the editing quality of technical orders,
monitoring the number of unreadable sentences is important and necessary. The number of
unreadable sentences found in a technical order was used as the measure of readability
performance (RP) as well as a readability performance index was provided to evaluate whether
the RP of individual readability characteristics of technical orders was adequate Different
readability characteristics make different grade of RP loss. Based on fuzzy multiple criteria
decision-making (Fuzzy MCDM) approaches, the SMES ranked and calculated the weights of all
factors. Simultaneously, the experts proposed the upper limits of unreadable sentences according
to the weights of individual readability characteristics. The technical orders issued by Taiwan
Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation was used as an example to evaluate the
readability of the technical orders and total RP losses for individual readability characteristics.
Finally, an improved way of editing quality for technical orders was recommended (Hsia, T.,
2008).
There is similar approach used to predict Cumulative Trauma Disorders (CTDs). The
objective of the research was used to develop a prediction equation using fuzzy quantification
theory following categorical risk factors: task, personal, and organizational. Fuzzy set theory
provided a quantitative method for analyzing vague and imprecise information. A three part
methodology was used including the identification of risk factors, analytical hierarchy process
(AHP), risk factor qualification and quantification. Subject Matter Experts were asked to identify
and classify risk factors as well as identify exposure limits. Also, they were asked to rank levels
of each factor as minimal, mild, moderate, strong, and very strong risk. AHP was utilized to
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assign relative weight to each risk factor and each risk factor category. Using a population of
diagnosed CTDS and non-CTDS hands, the developed model was used to determine its
reliability and sensitivity. The results found the model to be a good predictor of CTDS because
it quantified the risk factors that lead to CTDs. Therefore, CTDS could be mitigated and
prevented (McBell P, Crumpton-Young L, 1997). The model was comprehensive and holistic
approach that included several characteristics of CTDS. The subject matter experts have tested
the model and it was confirmed a valid approach for CTDs analysis. A similar approach will be
used to quantify and evaluate risk factors that influence falls in this current study.
Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) is a modeling technique frequently used where vague concepts
and imprecise data are handled, and it is capable of managing both imprecision and uncertainty
data (Bonisson, 1980). FST has been used for the development of the linguistic approach where
any variable is treated as a linguistic variable (i.e. Low, Medium, and High). FST can be used to
translate linguistic terms into numeric values to be used to get aggregate measures when given
several inputs. FST characterizes the concept of approximation based on membership functions
with a range between 0 and 1, which provides the lower and upper approximations of a concept
(Yao et al., 1992). Zimmerman identifies the necessity to use mathematical language to map
several membership functions and develop FST models.
On the contrary, the use of mathematical modeling techniques brings some limitations.
Real situations are not often precise, and the description of a real system often requires more
detailed data than a human being could ever recognize simultaneously (Schwartz, 1962 and
Zimmermann, 1991). FST provides a good starting point in the development of a conceptual
basis and can be utilized in the field of pattern classification (Zadeh, 1965). FST also provides a
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rigorous mathematical framework in which ambiguous data can be precisely studied
(Zimmermann, 1991).
Probability theory has been traditionally used for describing the phenomenon of
uncertainty; it deals with the expectation of future events based on something known. However,
the uncertainty represented by fuzziness is not the expectation of uncertainty; rather it is the
uncertainty resulting from the imprecision of a concept expressed by a linguistic term.
Probability is the theory of random events and the likelihood of events (Klir, G. J et al., 1997).
Traditional modeling techniques tend to eliminate factors which cannot be explained.
This process leads to inaccurate models caused by lost data. In order to develop a model that
displays factors that contribute to falls, FST was selected as the most feasible technique to
quantify these factors. Furthermore, linguistic approaches have been previously applied and
developed for use in FST, allowing factor variables to be represented as numerical values. One
of the most important advantages of using this technique is the opportunity to create a scale to
measure the factors that contribute to falls. The method is compatible with the current research
because the final results involve a qualitative and quantitative multifaceted model; that will be
used to predict falls in an aerospace environment. The technique will be used to quantify risk
factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
SMEs can be used to determine the relative weights of factor variables and assist in the
development of FST models. There are different ways to develop membership functions that
include direct methods (experts giving answers to various kinds of questions) and indirect
methods (experts are more general and less biased questions). This approach is beneficial for
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multi-faceted models. The use of SMEs can assist in the quantification of qualitative
performance measures (Klir, Y., 1995; Terrano et al., 1992)..

Models and tools for assessing risks and falls
The majority of fatal accidents in the construction industry are caused by falling from
heights. Investigators emphasize the importance of safety control, carried out systematically and
based on real-time data collection, as the most important element of accident prevention. An
automated model to monitor and control fall hazards was developed (Navon, R, Kolton, O,
2007). The model identifies the activities associated with risk of falls from heights and protective
measure such as guardrails. The model is designed to follow up the existing guardrails and
constantly compare their locations and lengths to the planned ones. Based on this comparison,
the model issues warnings whenever guardrails are missing, or temporarily removed. The model
provides reports and warnings. The reports are used for planning the materials, or employees,
needed to establish the protective measures. The model's main algorithms portray dangerous
activities and areas that were identified. But the proposed model was developed only to improve
safety during the construction stage. However, including safety in the design stage can improve
safety culture during the actual construction (Navon, R., Kolton, O., 2007).
The method of engineering risk analysis is based on a functional analysis of systems and
on the probabilities of the events and random variables that affect their performances. These
methods allow identification of a system's failure modes, computation of its probability of failure
or performance deterioration per time unit or operation, and the contribution of each component
to the probabilities and consequences of failures. The model includes the human decisions and
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actions that affect components' performances and the management factors that affect behaviors.
Therefore, these factors are the root causes of system failures. By computing the risk with and
without proposed measures, one can then set priorities among different risk management options
under resource constraints. In this study, the engineering risk analysis method is used to identify
a system's weaknesses and the most cost-effective way to fix them. The first example concerns
the heat shield of the space shuttle orbiter and shows the relative risk contribution of the tiles in
different areas of the orbiter's surface. The second application is to patient risk in anesthesia and
demonstrates how the engineering risk analysis method can be used in the medical domain to
rank the benefits of risk mitigation measures, in that case, mostly organizational. The third
application is a model of seismic risk analysis and mitigation, with application to the San
Francisco Bay area for the assessment of the costs and benefits of different seismic provisions of
building codes. The probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) method allowed identifying system
weaknesses and the most cost-effective way to fix them (Pate- Cornell, E., 2002).
The objective of the research is to establish fall prevention procedures (Navon, R., and
Kolton, O., 2006). The construction industry is very dynamic and prone to risks. As a result, not
enough time and effort are invested in safety issues. Fall from heights is the main cause for
fatalities and injuries in construction projects. The automated model developed identifies the
dangerous activities in the project's schedule. Additionally, it constantly compares the planned
guardrails (location and time) and the ones actually used oil site. The model provides
textual/graphical reports and warns when guardrails are missing, are incomplete or have been
misplaced. The model was implemented, tested in a real time project, and presented to 14 experts
who were asked to evaluate and validate it. The main conclusions were the model is accurate,
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enables early detection of fall hazards before and during design and construction stage, the
model is an important managerial, monitoring, and control tool keeping track of all fall hazards
and protective measures, and warns when a safety problem (Navon, R., and Kolton, O., 2006).
Decision analysis is a useful tool for risk management. There are several methods used
such as probabilistic techniques to assess the accident risk. Decisions made by organizational
leadership may affect the likelihood of an accident. Therefore, managerial and organizational
factors should be included in the risk modeling process. However, various analytic techniques
are not commonly used to understand the decisions that are made by these individuals. A
framework of value-focused thinking is used in order to understand the safety decisions made
within the research partner organization. The research describes the results of interviews held
with managers and employees from this organization. Through these interviews, we sought to
understand the values these experts apply in their roles within the organization and the objectives
they seek to achieve and contribute to its overall safety performance. The final analysis is a
framework that portrays the fundamental objectives of safe operations for various roles in the
organization and connects these different decisions (Merrick et al., 2005). Decision analysis is
essential to fall mitigation. For example, the leaders and subject matter experts play a major role
by making decisions for employee in regards to fall prevention. In addition, the management
enforces and requires safety best practices within an organization and specifically at NASA.
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Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)

Hierarchical classifications can help show relationships among categories. This research
has created a hierarchical category system where taxonomies were developed by organizing data
into different levels. In order to evaluate the feasibility of the categories and ratings, subject
matter experts were asked to review the relative weights obtained through AHP. Pair-wise
comparisons are frequently used to determine the relative importance of each factor.
Comparisons are made within modules to determine the relationship between the factors
identified by the experts (Saaty, 1990). A rating scale was developed and utilized for
comparisons where each pair wise comparison is rated on a scale from 1 to 9. In an AHP
analysis, the rating is used to define the degree of preference of one factor over another. The
value 1 represents equal importance of the two factors, X and Y, and the value 9 suggests X is
more important than Y. The inverse of the values is used if the expert considers that an inverse
relationship exists among the factors. Once the pair-wise matrix is developed, the relative
weights are obtained from the estimate of the maximum eigenvector of the matrix. The
normalized average weighting indicates the relative significance of each factor.
The AHP approach, which consists of a series of goals, criteria, and alternatives,
simplifies a complex problem into simple pair-wise comparisons. AHP is very useful in complex
decision-making, and plethora of software have been developed which assists with the
development of AHP, such as Expert Choice (Saaty, 1990). Pair-wise comparison is a problemsolving technique used to determine the relative order or ranking of a group of items resulting in
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a specific point value. Expert Choice was selected for this research. The following ratings were
used to develop the forms to be sent to all the SME.
Inconsistency Ratio
Furthermore, research performed by McCauley-Bell and Badiru used knowledge
acquisition to obtain factor relevance (McCauley-Bell et al., 1996). The scale to develop
membership functions was developed using the described approach in this research.
The inconsistency ratio is used to evaluate the SMEs’ ability to make consistent judgments. The
ratio identifies if the SMEs are cognizant or forget previous assessments across the activity. The
presence of inconsistency indicates that a SME is not coherent or that he or she does not
understand the assessment tool. The inconsistency ratio that is smaller than 0.1 reflects a
coherent SME. Therefore, inconsistency ratios those are greater than 0.1 represent a concern
(Hallowell, 2007). A series of pair-wise ratio-based comparisons were performed to evaluate
SMEs’ understanding of falls. This ratio was calculated by evaluating if the whole set of pairwise comparisons was done consistently.
Conclusion
The literature review identified the research need to develop a fuzzy analytical hierarchy
process model to evaluate factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
The need to develop a holistic model capable of evaluating a large number of key factors that
lead to falls is essential for all work environments. Therefore, a series of tools, methods, and
techniques are in conjunction with the development of fuzzy AHP model that has been
identified. The following sections cover in detail the proposed approach to solve the complex
mathematical modeling problem including qualitative and quantitative data. There was a plethora
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of literature on falls. The literature was partitioned into subcomponents such as system safety,
falls, fall risk assessments, risk factors, AHP, and fuzzy models. Table 6 gives a synopsis of the
literature.
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Table 6: Literature Review Summary

Topics

System
Safety

Falls

Task
Related

Organizational

Environmental

Human/Personal

Fall Risk Assessments and
Models

AHP

Fuzzy Models

Dagdeviren, M., 2008
McCauley-Bell, C-Y,
Baidur, 1997

X

X

X

X

Saaty, 1990

X

Hallowell, 2007

X

Authors
Tinetti, 1988

X

X

Leamon & Murphy, 1995

X

X

Maynard, 2002

X

Nietzel, 2008

X

Bobick, TG., 2004

X

Leveson, N, 2005

X

X

Bentley, T., 2009

X

X

X

X

Gauchard, 1999

X

X

Hanson, 2001

X

X

Bentley & Haslam, 1998

X

X

X

Ahn, Jae, 2003

X

X

Salazar, M., 2005

X

X

Hisao, 2008

X

X

Davis, 1983

X

X

X

Lord, S., 2003

X

X

X

Schwartz, 1962

X

Terrano, 1994

X

Zimmermann, 1991

X
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY
Experiment Overview
The purpose of the experiment is to develop a model that represents linguistic variables to
quantify and rank risk factors that contribute to falls. The variables are quantified using fuzzy set
theory. As a result, the model will evaluate the qualitative and quantitative data. (Zimmermann,
1991).
Research Variables
•
•

Dependent Variable: Fall (Effect)
Independent Variable: Risk factors that contribute to falls such as task related,
human/personal, environmental, organizational (Multiple Causes)

Research Hypothesis
The following are research hypotheses, which include the null and the alternative.
H0: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors can be useful
1

in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
H1: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors cannot be
useful in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
H0: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model can be developed to predict the
likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.

2
H1: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model cannot be developed to predict the
likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
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Research Questions
1. What are the contributing risk factors that influence falls in the workplace?
2. How do we quantify contributing risk factors that influence falls in NASA ground
support operations?
3. What is the total effect of these risk factors on falls?
4. How we will predict the likelihood of falls?

Research Phases
The following are the twelve major research phases:
1. Knowledge Acquisition: risk factors that contribute to falls are identified and classified.
The first phase is to the development of taxonomy for multiple risk factors that
contribute to fall (human/personal, task related, organizational, and environmental) to be
evaluated. The taxonomies characterize categorical risk factors, sub risk factors, and
factor variables affecting falls in the aerospace environment. The benchmark was to
identify the significant factors by observing the repeatability three or more occurrences
of risk factors in the literature review and compare it to the NASA/KSC Fall Hazard
Report and NASA/KSC Incident Report Information System (McCauley-Bell, Baidur,
1996).
2. Data Collection: the following data including scenarios characteristics were collected
from NASA/Kennedy Space Center Ground Support Operations Fall Hazard Report.
The three scenarios are Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), Launch Complex Payloads
(LCP), and the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). The definition of categorical factors
have been was developed in order to avoid any misunderstanding of the key factors to
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enhance the success and accuracy of the data collection process. NASA/KSC partnered
with Gravitec, Inc. to facilitate the data collection process within NASA Ground Support
Operations (NASA, 2005). The multiple risk factors in the following table that
contribute to falls will be assessed by using the surveys and the NASA Safety Index in
APPENDIX F. A taxonomy characterization has been developed for multiple risk
factors that contribute to falls, which include sub factors and factors variables identified
after performing an intensive literature review and fall hazard reports review. Table 7
represents multiple risk factors that contribute to falls, factor variables, and metrics to be
used for data collection in the research.
Table 7: Taxonomy
Conceptual Model
Factors
Task Related Factors
Task Frequency
Task Duration

Key
variable

Task Proximity
Environmental Factors
Fall Distance
Environmental Surface
Environmental
Conditions
Human/Personal
Factors
Worker Interference
Number of workers
Age
Organizational Factors
Fall Hazard Severity
Fall Hazard Protection
Fall Hazard Occurrence

Rating
Rating

Data Collection

Equipment or Instrument
Used

Rating

visual observation
visual observation
tape measure/meter stick
reading

meter stick/tape measure/index

feet/inches
Rating

tape measure/meter stick
reading
visual observation

meter stick/tape measure/index
index

Rating

visual observation

index

Rating
Rating
Birth date

visual observation
visual observation
Birth date/Driver's License

index
index
Survey

Rating
Rating
Rating

visual observation
visual observation
counting/visual observation

index
index
index
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index
index

The data in the following table which includes the scenarios characteristics were collected from
NASA/Kennedy Space Center Ground Support Operations and Gravitec Fall Hazard Report.
Table 8: Scenario Characteristics
Work Area

SLF

LCP

VAB

Task Duration

1.2-Medium

1.2-Medium

1.2 Medium

Task Frequency

1.1-Monthly

1.3-Daily

1.4-Shift

Task Proximity

1.2-Very close

1.2-Very close

1.2-Very close

Fall Distance

100 ft.

60 ft.

500 ft.

Environmental

1.2-Extreme

1.0-Good

1.1 –Variable

1.1-Poor

0.9-Excellent

0.9 Excellent

Age

32

47

25

# of workers

1 worker

1 worker

3 workers

Worker

1.0-Independent

1.0 Independent

1.2-Multiple

Fall Occurrence

1.0-Unique

1.2-Common

1.2-Common

Fall Severity

5.0-Extreme

5.0-Extreme

5.0-Extreme

Fall Protection

0.75-Poor

1.0-None

0.75-Poor

Factor

Conditions
Environmental
Surface

Interference
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3. SMEs interviews: The SMEs are representative of the environment being analyzed
(pool of subjects). The SMES were selected based on the ability to answer the questions
on the survey. The SMEs were selected based on experience/background and education
(e.g. B.S. in Engineering/Technical/Safety Related Field and/or minimum of five years
experience in Engineering/Technical/Safety Related Field). The SMEs were divided in
teams that are evenly distributed for model validation. Six Subject Matters completed
surveys using a voting system in NASA Expert Choice Team version. The SMES
consisted of 2 Fall Protection Experts, 2 Human Factors Expert, and 2 Safety Engineer
Experts. The voting system allows the SMES to make judgments simultaneously on risk
factors using the fundamental pairwise scale (Saaty, 1990).
4. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP): Structure the decision model. AHP is a Process
to analyze and structure a decision problem by prioritizing factors and alternatives
(Saaty, 1990)
5. Weight Validation: Testing the validity of the developed AHP model will be done by
comparing the priority vectors. The weight validation is justified by using the priority
vector to validate the model by having two different sets of experts/decision makers
create priority vectors separately. There will be three evenly distributed SMEs in each
group. If the resulting priority vectors of the two different sets of experts are similar and
that will validate the weights in the model. Priority vector is average weight of each
factor. If the results of both vectors are the same or close to each other, then the model is
confirmed valid. The ratings in AHP are subjective; which can lead to inconsistencies.
To level the discrepancies, a priority vector is calculated (Dagdeviren, M., 2008).
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6. Fuzzification of Variables:

Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) has been used for the

development of the linguistic approach where any variable is treated as a linguistic
variable. In this research, the linguistic variables are Low, Medium, and High. FST can
be used to translate linguistic terminology into numeric values to be used to get
aggregate measures when given many inputs (Bonisson, 1980).
7. Membership Function Development: FST characterizes the concept of approximation
based on membership functions with a range between 0 and 1, which provides the lower
and upper approximations of a concept (Yao, Y.Y & Wong, S. K. M, 1992).
8. Factor Qualification using Fuzzy Set Theory: In order to develop a model that
displays risk factors that contribute to falls, FST was selected as the most feasible
technique to quantify these risk factors (Zimmermann, 1991).
9. Factor Quantification using Fuzzy Set Theory: Linguistic methods have been
previously applied and developed for use in FST, allowing factor variables to be
represented as numerical values (Zimmermann, 1991).
10. Model Development: FST provided a basis for development of a conceptual model and
can be utilized in the field of pattern classification (Zadeh, 1965). Fuzzy Set Theory
offered a mathematical framework in which unclear data can be accurately studied
(Zimmermann, 1991).
11. Model Usability: Usability testing or usability practice is a technique used to evaluate a
product, system, or even model by testing it on users. It is gives direct input on how real
users use the system. Fifteen subjects were asked to apply fuzzy analytical hierarchy
process model to three scenarios in NASA Ground Support Operations. The subjects
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were fifteen engineers selected from UCF and NASA/KSC. The design of the
experiment was a repeated measures analysis.

Therefore, the subjects’ responses

(ratings of the three scenarios) were analyzed (Siegel, S., 1988).
12. Model Validation: In addition, the subjects were asked to evaluate the scenarios for the
model validation. These predicted values from the SME regarding the scenarios were
compared to the NASA accepted Scale for fall hazards. If the results of both models are
the same or close to each other, then the model is confirmed valid (Siegel, S., 1988).
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Scenarios
The following three scenarios were used in the model validation: Shuttle Landing Facility
(SLF), Launch Complex Payloads (LCP), and Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB).

SLF Scenario: Shuttle Landing Facility Mate/De-mate Device

Figure 13: Scenario 1 (Shuttle Landing Facility)

Case Study: One worker at the age of 32 is required to conduct routine maintenance on the
camera pictured in the red circle outside the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF). At this site, there is
no personal protection equipment. The maintenance includes lens cleaning, adjusting, focusing,
etc. Once outside the guardrail railing, workers are exposed to a fall distance is approximately
100 ft. to the ground.
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LCP Scenario: Launch Complex Payload 39 A & B (Launch Pad)

Figure 14: Scenario 2 (Launch Complex Payload)

Case Study: A 47 year old is working off of the Launch Complex Payload (LCP) platforms at
any level in this NASA/KSC facility on the orbiter payloads. There is minimal lighting in the
facility for the worker. The fall distance is 60 + ft off platforms. All edges of platforms are
unguarded. There is no fall protection equipment present.
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VAB Scenario: Vehicle Assembly Building Roof

Figure 15: Scenario 3 (Vehicle Assembly Building)
Case Study: During construction, up to approximately three workers with an average age of 25
replace and repair roof material near the edge of the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) roof.
Temporary Horizontal lifeline is installed (solid yellow line). A vertical line lifeline (dotted
yellow line) is mounted to adjust the system to the proper length. The fall distance is in excess of
500 ft and contingent upon what location or perimeter of the roof where the fall may occur.
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Schematic Diagram
The following schematic diagram represents the proposed fuzzy analytical hierarchy process
B E G I N

model.
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Figure 16: Schematic Diagram
(Dagdeviren, M., 2008; McCauley-Bell and Badiru, 1996)
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Fuzzy Model Algorithm
The following Algorithm was adopted from the previous (Dagdeviren, 2008) study
regarding a fuzzy AHP model (schematic diagram) for a faulty system in a work safety
environment. The method was emulated because falls are under the umbrella system safety and
is a hazard in the workplace.
BEGIN
Identify and classify the categorical risk factors and sub factors
(Conceptual Model)
Identify the significant factors that contribute to falls
(Literature Review and Other Sources)
Identification of significant categorical and sub-factors is conducting by observing the
repeatability of three or more of same risk factors in the literature, Fall Hazard Report (2005),
and current IRIS (NASA Mishap Data 2005-2008), etc. until the list was completely exhausted.
The following list is a sample of 40 risk factors observed in the literature from a list of
approximately 150 risk factors. For instance, age showed up approximately four times and
environmental surface showed up three times. The benchmark for determining the final risk
factors in the model was observing the reoccurrence of the same risk factor in the literature and
NASA Fall Hazard Report.

The multiple risk factors that contribute to falls in a general

environment were compared to an aerospace environment such as NASA Ground Support
Operations.
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Source of fall:
1. Slip and Trip (Davis, 1983)
2. Slip and Trip (Maynard, 2002)
3. Slip and Trips (Holmes, N., 1999)
4. Prioproception (Gauchard, 2001)
5. Prioprioception (S.Lord, 2003)
6. Poor lighting (Hanson, 1999)
7. Poor Lighting (Maynard, 2002)
8. Management (Salazar, M., 2005)
9. Leadership/Management ( Bentley & Haslam, 1998)
10. Age (Lockhart, 1998)
11. Age ( Bentley, 2009)
12. Age (Agnew, 1993)
13. Age (Webster, 2000)
14. Sex/Gender (Webster, 2000)
15. Sex ( BLS, 2007)
16. Sex/Gender ( Bentley, 2009 and Masud & Morris, 2001)
17. Behavior (Maynard, 2002)
18. Behavior (Salazar, M., 2005)
19. Heights (Maynard, 2002)
20. Heights (Holmes, N., 1999)
21. Heights (Maynard, 2002)
22. Surface Contaminants (Bentley, 2009)
23. Environmental Contaminants (Gauchard, 2001)
24. Floor Contaminants (Maynard, 2002)
25. Nonmoving vehicles (BLS, 2007)
26. Nonmoving vehicles: trucks (Jones, D. 2003)
27. Coefficient of Friction (Maynard, 2002)
28. Friction Variation (Chang, Wen-Ruey, 2008)
29. Posture (Wogalter, 2006)
30. Postural Control or Neuropathy (Kim, B.J., 2005)
31. Task Frequency (NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)
32. Task Frequency (IRIS, 2008)
33. Task Duration (NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)
34. Task Duration (IRIS, 2008)
35. Fall Hazard Occurrence (NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)
36. Fall Hazard Occurrence (IRIS, 2008)
37. Fall Hazard Protection (NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)
38. Fall Hazard Protection (IRIS, 2008)
39. Worker Interference (NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)
40. Worker Interference (IRIS, 2008)
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Table 9: Fall Risk Factors in NASA Ground Support Operations

Task Related Factors

Human/Personal Factors

Task Duration

Age

Task Frequency

Number of Workers

Task Proximity

Worker Interference

Organizational Factors

Environmental Factors

Fall Hazard Occurrence

Fall Distance/Direction

Fall Hazard Severity

Environmental Surface

Fall Hazard Protection

Environmental Conditions
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Structure the decision model
The following figure is the AHP Affinity Diagram. It is the decision model for the
research. The diagram displays the goal (objective), criteria (factors), and alternatives (areas of
the concern for fall hazards in NASA Ground Support Operations) in the AHP model (Saaty,
1990).

Goal:
Weight risk factors in
NASA Ground Support
Operations

Human/Personal
Task Factors

Organizational Factors

Environmental Factors

Factors

Task Proximity
Task Duration
Task Frequency

Age
Number of Workers
Worker Interference

Fall Hazard Protection
Fall Hazard Occurrence
Fall Hazard Severity

Alternative work areas
Facility maintenance
Space Shuttle Operations
Payloads
Cranes
Construction
Roofing

Figure 17: Affinity Diagram
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Fall Distance
Environmental Conditions
Environmental Surface

SME Interviews
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) Data Collection
Subject Matter Experts can provide some insight on fall prevention intervention. See
example of the voting instrument in the APPENDIX E. The numbers in the fundamental pairwise
scale represent the rating for each risk factor. For example, if a task related factor is strongly
more important than human/personal factor, then the rating will be five. The six subject matter
experts will be making pairwise comparisons within and between the risk factors based on the
previous fundamental scale. The three steps in AHP process are: perform pairwise comparisons,
assess consistency of pairwise judgments, and compute the relative weights.
Table 10: Pairwise Comparison Fundamental Scale
(Saaty, 1990)
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Expert Choice Software
Expert Choice Software was used to synthesize analyzed the SMEs results (Saaty, 1990).
The NASA/KSC Expert Choice voting system allows teams (subject matter experts) to vote
simultaneously by to making numerical judgments between risk factors that contribute to falls.
Determine the work environment
The areas that of concern for fall hazards in NASA Ground Support Operations are:
Facility maintenance, Space Shuttle Operations, Payloads, Cranes, Construction, and Roofing.
The model can be applied to any work environment. The higher and low boundaries were
determined by the expert team based on the work area and tasks according to the following range
for comprehensive Range of Fall Injury.
Determine the level of existence for each risk factor
The level of existence for each risk factor will be determined by using following
triangular fuzzy scale. The level of existence for each risk factor is determined from the fuzzy
membership functions inputs (the risk factor ranges). The level of existence is the numerical
value and linguistic variables for each risk factor that contribute to falls. The range of
comprehensive risk (CR) of falls is: 0 ≤ CR ≤ 1
Table 11: Triangular Fuzzy Scale
(Dagdeviren, M., 2008)
Linguistic variables

Meaning of Fuzzy Numbers

Low

0-.33

Medium

0.34-0.66

High

0.67-1.0
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Membership Functions
The next section is about Fuzzy Set Theory membership functions for various risk factors
that contribute to falls. A membership functions are used to characterize risk factors or portray
the universe of discourse. There are many types of fuzzy membership functions such as linear,
triangular, trapezoidal, Gaussian, bell, sigmoid (s-shaped), but two were selected and applied to
this research. Triangular membership function was selected to characterize the age
(human/personal risk factor) in relation to falls. However, a sigmoid (s-shaped) membership
function was selected to characterize the other risk factors such as task duration (task risk factor),
fall distance (environmental risk factor), and fall hazard occurrence (organizational risk factor).
A membership function (MF) is a curve that defines how each point in the input space or the
universe of discourse is mapped to a degree of membership between 0 and 1. Examples of fuzzy
or linguistic variables are low, medium, and high in regards to degree of membership for the level
of existence in the set.
In general, the triangular membership function can be specified from the formula below:

Equation 1

Where,
L is the left bound
R is the right bound
C is the center of the symmetric triangle
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Table 12: Membership Function Variables

µtriang(x) or µsigmoid (x)

x-value
Scalar quantity (risk factor that contribute to

Degree of membership for falls

falls)

Sigmoid membership functions are also called S-curve MF and are represented by increasing
and decreasing nonlinear functions. A growing s-shaped MF goes from the left-hand side which
represents no membership to the extreme right-hand side of the graph which represents a complete
membership. S-curve MF are represented by three parameters: α which represents zero membership
value, β the inflection point or the 50% membership point, and γ which represents complete
membership value. S-curve MF represents continuous cumulative distribution functions and is
commonly used to model population dynamics.
In general, the sigmoid membership function can be specified from the formula below:
, , ,
2
1

Equation 2

/
2

/

1
Where,
α= 0 degree of membership
β= 0.5 degree of membership or inflection point
γ= 1 degree of membership

`
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The following fuzzy model is representative of McCauley-Bell and Baiduru fuzzy model (1996)
by using the Fuzzy Quantification Linear Models (Terrano, 1994).
Calculate the Categorical Risk Factors for falls
Fuzzy Quantification Linear Models
Task Related Risk:
X1 = F(TR) = a1 w1 + a2 w2+ a3 w3 +…….+an wn
Human/Personal Risk:

Equation 3

X2 = F(HP) = b1 z1+ b2z2+ b3 z3 +……….+ bn zn
Organizational Risk:

Equation 4

X3 = F(O) = c1 u1 + c2 u2 + c3u3 +……….+ cn un
Environmental Risk:

Equation 5

X4=F(E) = d1 v1 + d2 v2 + d3 v3 +……...+dn vn
where,

Equation 6

a= task related risk sub-factors relative weight
b=human/personal risk sub-factors relative weight
c=organizational risk sub-factors relative weight
d=environmental risk sub-factors relative weight
w=task related risk sub-factors level of existence
z=human/personal risk sub-factors level of existence
u=organizational risk sub-factors level of existence
v=environmental risk sub-factors level of existence
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Calculate the Comprehensive Risk (CR) for falls
Fuzzy Quantification linear models
The following equation was used to quantify the comprehensive risk of a fall is a result of
all three categories:

Y= e1X1 + e2X2 + e3XR3 +e4X4

Equation 7

where,
Y = comprehensive risk for the given condition
X1 = the risk associated with the task related factors
e1 = weighting factor for the task related factors
X2 = the risk associated with the human/personal factors
e2 = weighting factor for the human/personal factors
X3 = the risk associated with the organizational factors
e3 = weighting factor for the organizational factors
X4 = the risk associated with the environmental factors
e4 = weighting factor for the environmental factors
The weighting factors (e1, e2, e3, e4) represent the relative significance of the given risk factor
category's contribution to the likelihood of injury.
The comprehensive risk is the aggregate value for the prediction of a fall; which is equal to the
product of relative weight respective to the categorical risk factors.
Determine the likelihood rating for the associate risk for falls
The following table represents the aggregate risk value based on the comprehensive risk number
and the rating associated with the fall injury in a work environment.
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Table 13: Aggregate Risk Value Table
(McCauley-Bell & Baiduru, 1996)
Aggregate Risk Value

Risk Association

Likelihood
Rating

0.00 - 0.20

Very Low risk: Falls are very

1

unlikely to occur. Strong Controls are in
place.
0.21 - 0.40

Low risk: Falls are not likely to

2

occur. Controls have minor limitations and
uncertainties.
0.41 - 0.60

Moderate risk: Falls may occur.

3

Controls exist with some uncertainties.
0.61 - 0.80

High risk: Falls are highly likely

4

to occur. Controls have significant
uncertainties.
0.81 - 1.00

Very high risk: Falls are nearly
certain to occur. Controls have little or no
effect.
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5

Model Application

Based on the comprehensive risk range, the boundaries were set by the SMEs. The High
and Low Bounds are contingent upon the range for Comprehensive Risk (CR) of Injury.

Where,
CR=Y
High Bound (HB)
HB>=0.50
Low Bound (LB)
LB<=0.49

Apply the If and Then Rule followed by then the Loop process. Verify the high boundary (HB).
If CR ≥ HB , YES then stop process/task and redesign the work area and recalculate the CR
again. If NO, then verify the low boundary (LB). If CR ≥ LB , YES, then perform corrective
action for the work area. If NO, execute the process/task in the work area and end the procedure.
END
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The following chapter discusses the research findings. The model was developed by
combining and defining multiple risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support
Operations.

AHP Analysis
The following weights in Figure 18 were obtained from the Expert Choice Software after
entering the six SMEs judgments of the multiple risk factors that contribute to falls. The following

are relative weights for these risk factors: Task Related (0.314), Human/Personal (0.307),
Environmental (0.248), and Organizational (0.130). The overall inconsistency ratio for all the
risk factors was 0.07, which indicates the model results were acceptable. The results show that
task related risk factors are the highest cause for falls and the organizational risk are the lowest
cause for falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
Goal: Weighting risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground
Support Opertations
Task Related Factors (L: .314)
Task Duration (L: .168)
Task Frequency (L: .451)
Task Proximity (L: .381)
Human/Personal Factors (L: .307)
Age (L: .209)
Number of Workers (L: .263)
Worker Interference (L: .528)
Organizational Factors (L: .130)
Fall Hazard Severity (L: .289)
Fall Hazard Occurence (L: .356)
Fall Hazard Protection (L: .354)
Environmental Factors (L: .248)
Environmental Suface (L: .422)
Environmental Condition (L: .298)
Fall Distance (L: .279)

Figure 18: AHP Weights
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AHP for Groups
AHP can be especially useful with groups. Each member’s assessments can, of course, be
evaluated for priorities and inconsistency, and then the group rollup (group segments) can be
synthesized and viewed the same way. This can be a powerful way to build consensus, as each
constituent can see where they stand and compare it to the group as a whole. If the group has a
high inconsistency ratio (more than 0.1, or so) segmenting might reveal where the differences in
agreement are and why they exist. That, too, can help lead to better understanding and
consensus. Figure 19 shows the weights for the categorical risk factors where Task Related is
0.314, Human/Personal is 0.307, Environmental is 0.248, and Organizational is 0.130. Therefore,
task is highest contributing factor to falls and organizational factors are the lowest contributing
factor to falls. The inconsistency ratio was 0.01, which is acceptable.

Task Related Factors
Human/Personal Factors
Organizational Factors
Environmental Factors
Inconsistency = 0.01
with 0 missing judgments.

.314
.307
.130
.248

Figure 19: Categorical Risk Factors Weights
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The relative weights for the task related risk factors are as follows: task frequency
(0.451), task proximity (0.381), and task duration (0.168). It can be inferred from Figure 20 that
Task Frequency is the highest contributing factors to fall and the task duration is the lowest
contributing factor to falls. The inconsistency ratio is 0.11, which is acceptable.

Task Frequency
Task Proximity
Task Duration
Inconsistency = 0.11
with 0 missing judgments.

.451
.381
.168

Figure 20: Task Related Risk Factors Weights
The relative weights for the human/personal risk factors are as follows: worker
interference (0.528), task proximity (0.263), and task duration (0.209). It can be inferred from
Figure 21 that Worker Interference is the highest contributing factor to falls and the age is the
lowest contributing factor to falls. The inconsistency ratio is 0.01, which is acceptable.

Worker Interference
Number of Workers
Age
Inconsistency = 0.01
with 0 missing judgments.

.528
.263
.209

Figure 21: Human/Personal Risk Factors Weights
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The relative weights for the organizational risk factors are as follows: fall hazard
occurrence (0.356), fall hazard protection (0.354), and task duration (0.289). It can be inferred
from Figure 22 that fall hazard occurrence is the highest contributing factor to falls and the fall
hazard severity is the lowest contributing factor to falls. The inconsistency ratio is 0.00, which
indicates there was no inconsistency among the SMEs on these risk factors.

Fall Hazard Occurence
Fall Hazard Protection
Fall Hazard Severity
Inconsistency = 0.00
with 0 missing judgments.

.356
.354
.289

Figure 22: Organizational Risk Factors Weights
The relative weights for the environmental risk factors are as follows: environmental
surface (0.422), environmental condition (0.289), and fall distance (0.279). It can be inferred
from Figure 20 that environmental surface is the highest contributing factor to falls and the fall
distance is the lowest contributing factor to falls. The inconsistency ratio is 0.11, which is
acceptable.

Environmental Suface
Environmental Condition
Fall Distance
Inconsistency = 0.11
with 0 missing judgments.

.422
.298
.279

Figure 23: Environmental Risk Factor Weights

79

The following figure shows the synthesis and global weight with respect to the primary
goal. It is inferred from the table that worker interference, task frequency, and task proximity are
the highest risk factors leading to falls. The global weights are 0.162, 0.142, and 0.120
respectively. Therefore, task related factors are the leading risk factors that contribute to falls.
From employee perspective, it is important to be cognizant of task related risk factors that lead to
falls. It is observed from the research, the task related risk factors are the most relevant.
NASA/Kennedy Space Center is a unique aerospace environment where specific tasks are
performed from excessive heights. In this aerospace environment, tasks are schedule driven. It is
imperative that the employee understands that task being performed, aware of the fall hazards
and others while performing the task, and performs the task with safety measures in order to
mitigate falls.
In addition, the inconsistency ratios for the individual SMES were all 0.3 and below,
which indicates little discrepancy within and between the SMEs. For example, the safety experts
inconsistency ratio was approximately 0.2, which indicates there is an agreement among the
experts. The overall inconsistency for the model is 0.07. Therefore, the results are acceptable
because the value is 0.1 or less.
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Synthesis with respect to:
Goal: Weighting risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Opertations

Overall Inconsistency = .07
Task Duration
Task Frequency
Task Proximity
Age
Number of Workers
Worker Interference
Fall Hazard Severity
Fall Hazard Occurence
Fall Hazard Protection
Environmental Suface
Environmental Condition
Fall Distance

.053
.142
.120
.064
.081
.162
.038
.046
.046
.105
.074
.069

Figure 24: Synthesis with respect to the goal
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Weight Validation
The ratings in AHP are subjective; which can lead to inconsistencies. There are several
ways to validate the weights from the AHP. Please see the following table that displays a few
alternative ways to validate relative weights in a model. The method that involves creating
priority vectors among teams (Dagdeviren, M, 2008) will be used in this research.
Table 14: Alternative Methods for Weight Validation

Method

Reference

Estimation of overall workloads using physiological
and epidemiological viewpoints and compared to
NASA TLX results. (Risk Assessment)

(Jung and Jung, 2001)

Expert Opinions and Consistency Index (CI) of a
matrix. (SWOT-ANP Model)

(Yuksel I. and Dagdeviren, M.,
2007)

Comparison of priority vector from the studies using
AHP with the actual relative weight vector to
analyze validation. (AHP model)

(Whitaker, R., 2007)

Using the priority vector to validate the model by
having two to three different team of subject matter
experts create priority vectors separately and
compare results. (AHP model)

(Dagdeviren, M., 2008)
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To level the discrepancies, a priority vector is calculated. Testing the validity of the
developed model will be done by comparing the priority vectors to actual weights. As indicated
in the methodology, the model will be validated by having two teams of subject matter experts
create priority vectors separately. There will be three evenly distributed SMEs in each group
including a human factors expert, fall protection expert, and a safety expert. If the resulting
priority vectors of the two different sets of experts are similar and that will validate the weights
in the model. Priority vector is average weight of each factor. If the results of both vectors are the
same or close to risk factors’ relative weights, then the model is confirm valid.
Table 15 is the pairwise comparison matrix from Expert Choice Software for the
categorical risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Operations. The values
in the table are based on SMEs rankings for the risk factors. The values in the rows are multiples
of each other. The values were determined by normalizing the columns. The values in Table 15
are the geometric averages between the judgments of risk factors. The sum is the total value for
each column or the categorical risk factor. The diagonal elements of the matrix are all 1’s for a
consistent matrix.
Table 15: Pairwise Comparison Matrix
Task
Related

Human/Personal

Organizational

Environmental

Task Related

1

1

2.5

1.25

Human/Personal

1

1

2.84

1

Organizational

0.39

0.35

1

1.51

Environmental

0.8

1

0.6

1

Sum

3.19

3.35

7.3

4.76
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The following values in Table 16 were determined by dividing each entry in the pairwise
comparison matrix by the sum. The subject matter experts calculated the average of results for
each categorical risk factor, which is the priority vector and compared it to the relative weights
from Expert Choice Software. The results are similar. Therefore, the weights are confirmed
valid.
Table 16: Priority Vector

Risk Factor
Task Related 0.313

Priority Vector

Relative Weight

Rank

0.298

0.342

0.262

0.304

0.314

1

0.313

0.298

0.389

0.210

0.302

0.307

2

Environmental 0.2501

0.298

0.0821

0.210

0.21

0.248

3

Organizational 0.122

0.104

0.136

0.317

0.17

0.13

4

Human/
Personal

The results in table 16 show that task related are the highest contributor risk factors to
falls and organizational are the lowest contributor risk factors to falls in NASA Ground Support
operations. It can be inferred from the results how a worker can perceive a risk associated with a
task. For example, if a worker is performing facility maintenance where the fall hazard is 100 ft.
versus 8 ft. in an elevated work area, they may assume a high risk for that task. As result, this
situation could lead to a fall. Also, a worker may be schedule driven, influenced by peer
pressure, and neglected to wear personal protection equipment. This is a characteristic of a
human/personal risk factor that could lead to fall. In addition, environmental risk factors lead to
falls. For instance, the environmental conditions concerning the hot or cold weather could lead to
a fall. The weather can affect the environmental surface and the worker. If the weather is hot, the
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worker may prematurely fatigue from heat exhaustion and perspire while performing the task. If
the weather is cold specifically snowing; with the change in temperature, the worker may slip on
melting ice and lead to a fall. Therefore, it is confirmed that organizational would be least
contributor risk factors to falls.
Fuzzy AHP Model
Membership Functions
Membership Functions will be developed for the following risk factors that
contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Operations: Task Duration, Fall Distance, Fall
Hazard and Occurrence. The ranges for the membership functions were determined by the
subject matter experts (SMEs) and the NASA Safety Index in the APPENDIX F. The
linguistic variables in the membership functions are based on the meaning of fuzzy numbers
in Table 11 and Table 25.
Human/Personal Factor: Age
Figure 25 is the Age Membership Function. It forms the shape of a triangle. It can be
inferred from figure 25 that at the age of 45, there are high instances for falls and there is a high
degree of fall injuries.
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Age Membership Function
1.2

Degree of membership

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0

20

40

Age (years)

60

80

Figure 25: Age Membership Function

Table 17: Age Linguistic Variables
Human/Personal Factor
Triangle
Age (years)
21
33.25
40
45.5
57.75
70

Degree of Membership
0
0.5
0.77
1
0.5
0
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Ling. Var.
low
medium
high
high
medium
low

It can be inferred from Table 17 that during the age range of 40-45, there are high
instances for falls and fall injuries. There was a common thread and trends in the fall
data and among other studies. For the age range of 40-45, there are high occurrences or
instances for falls. There is a parenthetical remark to be made about the observation in the
research. It is not scientifically sound to say that there is a high degree of likelihood for
falls due to the unknown base population. In decision analysis, there is a concept called
base rate neglect or base rate fallacy. The base rate fallacy, also called base rate neglect,
is an error that occurs when the conditional probability of some hypothesis H (educated
guess) given some evidence E is assessed without taking sufficient account of the "base
rate" or "prior probability" of H. In other words, the terminology refers to a decision
maker using specific information and neglecting the base rate information. For example,
the campus police will say that a Honda Accord is the most stolen on the UCF Campus.
Of course, UCF is a large campus and have many cars on campus. It can be inferred that
the Honda Accord has a high degree of likelihood of being stolen! The statement is false.
Likelihood is state of being probable. The Honda Accord is a popular car and there are
more Honda Accord’s on campus. The Honda Accord could have a low likelihood of
being stolen and still be the most stolen car on campus. The population of cars on UCF
campus needs to be investigated before the Honda Accord is declared the car with the
highest degree of likelihood for being stolen. Lastly, according the statistics, the
population at NASA/KSC consists of majority of employees in the age range of 40-45
years of age. In addition, according to the BLS Data in Table 18, the greatest number of
falls occurred in the age range of 45 to 54 in 2005, 2006, and 2007.
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Table 18: BLS Data
BLS Age Range
Falls 2005

Falls 2006

Falls 2007

25 to 34

48,760

44,310

44,900

35 to 44

60,170

54,280

55,580

45 to 54

63,720

57,990

65,670

55 to 64

41,480

39,540

48,100

65 and over

11,290

10,320

11,210

Age:

Task Related Factor: Task Duration
Figure 26 is the Task Duration Membership Function. It forms the s-shape curve. It can
be inferred from figure 26 that as the task duration increases, the high instances for the falls
increases. Therefore, the variables are directly proportional.
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Task Duration Membership Function
1.2

1

Degree of Membership

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0

20

40
60
Task Duration (hours)

Figure 26: Task Duration Membership Function

89

80

100

Table 19: Task Duration Linguistic Variables
Task Related Factor
S-shaped
Task Duration (hours)
8
31
40
44
71
80

Degree of Membership
0
0.5
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

Ling. Var.
low
medium
high
high
high
high

It can be inferred from Table 19 that a worker performing a task approximately 40 hours
or more are exposed to a high risk for falls and spending a long time in proximity to a fall
hazard.
Environmental Factor: Fall Distance
The fall distance membership function was developed based on the Fall Hazard Severity
Index. The membership function forms the s-shape curve. It can be interrupted from the figure
27 that as the fall distance increases, the likelihood for falls increases. These variables are also
directly proportional.
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Fall Distance Membership Function
1.2

Degree of Membership

1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

10

20

30

40

Fall Distance (feet)

Figure 27: Fall Distance Membership Function

Table 20: Fall Distance Linguistic Variables
Environmental Factor
S-shaped
Fall Distance (feet)
0
5
10
15
25
30

Degree of Membership
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
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Ling. Var.
low
low
medium
medium
high
high

It can be observed from Table 20 that if a fall distance is 25 ft or higher, there are high
instances for falls and there is a likelihood of a fall hazard. The fall hazard is likely to cause a
critical injury, permanent or temporary disability and in some cases death.
Organizational Factor: Fall Hazard Occurrence
The fall hazard occurrence membership function was developed based on the Fall Hazard
Occurrence Index. The membership function forms the s-shape curve. It can be inferred from
the Figure 28 that as the fall hazard occurrence increases, the likelihood for falls increases. Thus,
the variables are directly proportional.

Fall Hazard Occurrence Membership Function
1.2

1

Degree of Membership

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0

20

40

60

80

100

Fall Hazard Occurrence (locations)

Figure 28: Fall Hazard Occurrence Membership Function
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Table 21: Fall Hazard Occurrence Linguistic Variables
Organizational Factor
S-shaped
Fall Hazard Occurrence (locations)
10
25
35
50
75
100

Degree of Membership
0
0.45
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

Ling. Var.
low
medium
high
high
high
high

It can be inferred from Table 21, that if a fall hazard is at 35 or more locations, there is
high risk for falls and is considered recurring safety hazard. There number of falls will increase if
the fall hazard incidents increase.

Risk Factor Ranges for Existence
Table 22 lists the ranges that were established for each variable. These ranges are based
on the NASA Safety Index in the APPENDIX F and in some cases SME input. If the fall hazard
occurrence is 50 locations, it is considered a 1.4 in the NASA Safety Index Scale. As a result,
the risk factors are associated with a task index for NASA Ground Support Operations.
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Table 22: Ranges for Risk Factors
Conceptual Model Factors
Task Related Factors
Task Frequency
Task Duration
Task Proximity

Ranges for Fuzzy Model (Left to Right)
0.1 to 2.0
1.0 to 2.0
1.0 to 2.0 ( in relation to Fall Distance)

Environmental Factors
Fall Distance
Environmental Surface

0-10ft= low (0.33), 11-15 ft= medium (0.66), >25 ft, =high (1.0)
0.9 to 2.0

Environmental Conditions

0.9 to 2.0

Human/Personal Factors
Worker Interference
Number of workers
Age

1.0 to 2.0
1 to 5 (dependent on workers)
21-70 (years)

Organizational Factors
Fall Hazard Severity
Fall Hazard Protection
Fall Hazard Occurrence

1 to 10
0.1 to 2.0
1.0 to 2.0

Mathematical Model
The fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (AHP) model was validated by requesting 15
subjects apply it to three scenarios in NASA Ground Operations. The three scenarios selected for
the model validation are: Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), Launch Complex Payload (LCP), and
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). The following data including scenario characteristics was
collected for each scenario.
The following level of existence listed in Table 24 was based on the ranges for each risk
factor and the scenario characteristics listed in Table 23. The data in Table 23 was collected by
NASA SMES. The ranges were inputted in the triangular membership function. The output was
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the level of existence for each risk factor. For example, for SLF, age range is 21-70 and the age
for the scenario was 32 years. Therefore, 21 is the left bound and 70 is right bound in the
triangular membership function. The inputs are these boundaries and the output is the level of
existence for each risk factor.
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Table 23: Scenario Characteristics
(NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)
Work Area

SLF

LCP

VAB

Task Duration

1.2-Medium

1.2-Medium

1.2 Medium

Task Frequency

1.1-Monthly

1.3-Daily

1.4-Shift

Task Proximity

1.2-Very close

1.2-Very close

1.2-Very close

Fall Distance

100 ft.

60 ft.

500 ft.

Environmental

1.2-Extreme

1.0-Good

1.1 –Variable

1.1-Poor

0.9-Excellent

0.9 Excellent

Age

32

47

25

# of workers

1 worker

1 worker

3 workers

Worker

1.0-Independent

1.0 Independent

1.2-Multiple

Fall Occurrence

1.0-Unique

1.2-Common

1.2-Common

Fall Severity

5.0-Extreme

5.0-Extreme

5.0-Extreme

Fall Protection

0.75-Poor

1.0-None

0.75-Poor

Factor

Conditions
Environmental
Surface

Interference
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Table 24: Risk Factor Level of Existence

SLF

LCP

VAB

Task Duration

.4

.4

.4

Task Frequency

.95

.74

.63

Task Proximity

.4

.4

.4

Fall Distance

1.0

1.0

1.0

Environmental

.54

.18

.36

Environmental Surface

.36

0

0

Age

.48

.94

.16

Number of workers

0

0

1

Worker Interference

0

0

.4

Fall Occurrence

0

.4

.4

Fall Severity

.88

.88

.88

Fall Protection

.68

.94

.68

Work Area

Factor

Conditions
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Development of the Linguistic Variables
As indicated in the methodology section, the following table represents the linguistic
variables and the meaning of the fuzzy numbers. The following values are based on the
triangular membership function where there are three points (e.g. low, medium, high). The
meaning of the fuzzy numbers are the ranges for the linguistic variables developed from the
subject matter experts and fuzzy AHP study for safety (Dagdeviren, M., 2008).
Table 25: Meaning of Fuzzy Numbers
Linguistic variables

Fuzzy Numbers

Low

0-.33

Medium

0.34-0.66

High

0.67-1.0
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Model Usability
Usability testing or usability practice is a technique used to evaluate a product, system, or
in this research a model by testing it on users. It gives the direct input on how real users use the
system. The model usability involves the application of Fuzzy Quantification Linear Models
presented below. The general linear equations were presented in the Methodology section. Using
the weights from AHP and the level of existence for each risk factor, the fuzzy linear equations
will be solved.
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) Scenario
The following are the results for the Shuttle Landing Facility.
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Launch Complex Payloads (LCP) Scenario
The following are the results for the Launch Complex Payloads.
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.
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Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) Scenario
The following are the results for the Vehicle Assembly Building.
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Table 26 is the Aggregate Risk Value table from a previous study with a few
modifications (McCauley-Bell and Baiduru, 1996). The ranges in Table 26 were developed by
the Subject Matter Experts. The following table was applied in the model usability to determine
the aggregate risk values and likelihood rating. The likelihood rating and risk are based on the
comprehensive risk value (Y).
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Table 26: Aggregate Risk Value and Likelihood Rating
Risk Value
0.00 - 0.20

Risk
Very Low risk: Falls are very unlikely

Likelihood Rating
1

to occur. Strong Controls are in place.
0.21 - 0.40

Low risk: Falls are not likely to

2

occur. Controls have minor limitations and
uncertainties.
0.41 - 0.60

Moderate risk: Falls may occur.

3

Controls exist with some uncertainties.
0.61 - 0.80

High risk: Falls are highly likely to

4

occur. Controls have significant uncertainties.
0.81 - 1.00

Very high risk: Falls are nearly
certain to occur. Controls have little or no
effect.
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The comprehensive risk values for the following scenarios are: Shuttle Landing Facility
(0.404), Launch Complex Payloads (0.351), and Vehicle Assembly Building (0.451). The
predicted values and accepted values are the likelihood ratings for each scenario. Therefore, the
Shuttle Landing Facility and Launch Complex Payloads had a likelihood rating of two; which is
a low risk environment for falls. Falls are not likely to occur. The controls in the environment
have minor limitations and uncertainties. However, the Vehicle Assembly Building had a
likelihood rating of three; which is a moderate risk environment for falls. Falls may occur.
Controls exist with some uncertainties in this environment. Thus, predicted value from Table 26
was compared to accepted value in Table 27. Table 27 is the Fall Hazard Accepted Scale from
NASA/Kennedy Space Center Safety Report developed by the NASA Contractor and NASA
Safety Directorate.

Table 27: NASA Fall Hazard Accepted Table
Risk Value

Risk

Likelihood Rating

0-5

Low Risk Hazards

1

6-10

Medium Risk

2

Hazards
10-15

High Risk Hazards

3

15-20

Dangerous Risk

4

Hazards
20-25

Extreme Hazards
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The percentage error was calculated for each scenario by the Subject Matter Expert (NASA
Safety Manager) using the following equation:

%error =

( predicted− accepted)
accepted

Equation 23

Percentage error is the estimate minus the true value divided by the true value and
multiplied by 100 with the absolute value. In this case, it is predicted value minus the accepted
divided by the accepted value multiplied by 100. The final result is the absolute value of the
answer. For example, the accepted values for the three scenarios were: SLF:2, LCP:3, VAB:3,
and the predicted values were: SLF:2, LCP:2, and VAB:3. The likelihood ratings were very
similar. Therefore, the percentage error for the three scenarios was 0%, 33%, and 0%
respectively.
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NASA Safety Risk Scorecard
The research involves evaluating risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground
Support Operations, it is imperative to relate the fuzzy AHP model to the NASA Safety Risk
Scorecard. Showing a correlation between the fuzzy AHP model and the NASA Safety Risk
scorecard is the empirical approach to the research and the first time being used in the research.
Table 26 and Table 27 have 5 ranges associated with the risk and the NASA risk Scorecard has 5
levels associated with the risk assessment. The NASA Safety Risk Scorecard is a method to
assess risks at NASA and specifically the future Constellation Program. The NASA risk
scorecard includes a 5 x 5 matrix in figure 29. For instance, a worker is performing a task on
High Bay 3 area for the Constellation Project at NASA/Kennedy Space Center. The worker does
not use pre manufactured fall protection equipment because the fall distance is assumed not to be
detrimental to the welfare and safety of the human being.

Therefore, in this case the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirement for a fall hazard is
neglected. The subject matter expert evaluates the fall hazard as highly likely to occur. The
controls have significant uncertainties in the work environment. Consequently, there may be a
loss of life or permanently disabling injury to the worker. The final assessment using the
following NASA Scorecard is a 4 x 5 risk. Thus, fall hazard risk is high (Red) and catastrophic.
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Consequence

Component

1

2

3

4

5

Safety

Personnel

Minor Injury

Injury requiring

Injury or illness;

Severe injury or

Loss of Life or permanently disabling

first aid treatment

medical treatment

hospitalization

injury

Minor damage or

Minor damage to

Minor damage to

Loss of mission, major

Loss of Flight or Ground Assets or Loss of

non essential

the program

flight, Ground

damage to flight,

vehicle prior to completing its mission

flights assets

critical needs

Support assets,

Negligible;

Minor reportable

Moderate

Major OSHA/EPA

Serious or repeat OSHA/EPA violation;

OSHA/EPA

OSHA/EPA

OSHA/EPA

violation causing

termination of project or program

violation non

violation;

violation which

temporary stoppage

reportable

reportable

requires immediate

System Safety

Environmental

remediation

Figure 29: NASA Risk Scorecard
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Catastrophic hazard

Figure 30 is an example of project where the NASA Safety Risk Scorecard can be
applied. NASA/Kennedy Space Center is currently working on the Constellation project for
the new vehicle entitled, Orion 606D Ground Operations. Figure 30 displays simulated
models are from the NASA/KSC Design Visualization Lab of Human Factors capabilities in
Delmia Envision that portrays the tasks being performed in the Aerospace Industry. The tasks
contain the physical system with a human. NASA Risk Scorecard can be used evaluate the
following work areas and determine the fall hazards in each area. Figure 30 is the models for
Launch Pad Operations (Pad 39 B) and Hazardous Servicing; which are considered fall
hazards. Disclaimer: NASA/KSC Constellation Ground Ops Project is under development
and material is subject to update.

21

25

24

20

Figure 30: Constellation Orion 606D Models
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Statistical Analysis
Repeated Measures Analysis
Repeated measures analysis is a systematic method to validate a model. There are fifteen
subjects participating in the model validation. They are applying the fuzzy AHP model to three
scenarios. They are repeating the same technique for all three cases. Therefore, design of
experiment for the model validation was a repeated measures analysis. Repeated measures are
multiple measurements of some kind being made on the same subject. Repeated measures
analysis of variance involves two types of factors--between subject factors and within subject
factors. The repeated measures make up the levels of the within subjects factor. The objective of
the repeated measure analysis is to test for significant differences in means when the same
observation appears in multiple levels of a factor.
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance
The following are the research hypotheses that were tested in the research.
H0: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors can be useful
1

in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
H1: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors cannot be
useful in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
H0: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model can be developed and validated to

2

predict the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
H1: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model cannot be developed to predict the
likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
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A Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance test, Attribute Agreement analysis, t-test, and an
analysis of variance test were performed on the data to evaluate the hypothesis.
When several measurements are taken on the same experimental unit (e.g. person, plant,
machine, subject etc.), the measurements tend to be correlated with each other. When the
measurements represent qualitatively different things, such as weight, length, and width, this
correlation is best taken into account by use of multivariate methods, such as multivariate
analysis of variance. When the measurements can be thought of as responses to levels of an
experimental factor of interest, such as time, treatment, or dose, the correlation can be taken into
account by performing a repeated measures analysis of variance.
Agreement of Data
The Attribute Agreement analysis and Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance test was
performed to evaluate the agreement of data within and between subjects in the model validation.
Attribute Agreement Analysis
Attribute Agreement Analysis is a quality assessment tool used to evaluate the agreement
of subjects while appraising data. This analysis was done using Minitab. The session in Minitab
includes the following tables
Within Appraiser: Does each subject rate scenarios consistently?
across trials? In other words, does the appraiser give the same rating to the
same scenario each time?
Between Appraiser: Doe the subjects’ ratings agree with each other?
That is, do different appraisers give the same rating to the same scenario?
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The following results in Figure 31 are the Minitab output regarding the Attribute
Agreement Analysis for the ratings in the model validation. The results show that one
subject; which is subject # 2 did not rate the scenario the same as the other subjects. The
rationale for subject #2 incorrect rating is that the subject most likely did not understand
the scenario. The subjects applied the fuzzy AHP model to the scenarios. The scenarios
were evaluated twice. For instance, there were three scenarios inspected and only two
matched in the trials. In Figure 31, it shows that all subjects inspected 3 scenarios and the
ratings were matched for scenarios except for one subject. For the fourteen subjects, the
95% confidence interval (CI) for percent matched is 36.85% to 100%. For the one
subject, the 95% confidence interval (CI) for percent matched is 9.43% to 99.16%. The
percent matched for the fourteen subjects was 100%. The percent matched for the one
subject was 66.67%. The rationale for this one subject’s incorrect rating is due ambiguity
and misapprehension of the scenario in the model usability. Therefore, the fuzzy AHP
model is precise, intuitive, and applicable for the evaluation of risk factors that lead to
falls.
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Within Appraisers
Assessment Agreement
Appraiser#

Inspected#

Matched

Percent

95 % CI

Subject 1

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 10

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 11

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 12

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 13

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 14

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 15

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 2

3

2

66.67

Subject 3

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 4

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 5

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 6

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 7

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 8

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 9

3

3

100.00

(36.84, 100.00)

( 9.43,

99.16)

# Matched: Appraiser agrees with him/herself across trials.
Between Appraisers
Assessment Agreement
# Inspected
3

2

# Matched
66.67

Percent

95 % CI

(9.43, 99.16)

# Matched: All appraisers' assessments agree with each other.

Figure 31: Attribute Agreement Analysis Data
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Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance is useful in the research because it shows the
agreement of data without discrepancies. The Kendall test is one of the many nonparametric
measures of correlation in statistics and used for test consistency among the subjects. A
coefficient of agreement or concordance is between different sets of rank orderings of the same
set of things. The test can be used to interpret quantitative data. In addition, the test indicates the
degree of association of ordinal assessments made by multiple appraisers when evaluating the
same samples.
Interpreting Kendall's coefficient of concordance
Kendall's coefficient of concordance ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the value of Kendall
Coefficient, the stronger the association (Siegel et al, 1988). Generally Kendall's coefficients of
0.9 or above are considered great. A high or significant Kendall's coefficient means that the
appraisers are applying essentially the same standard when evaluating the samples. The
following results show that the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance is 1.00, which indicates the
outstanding high degree of agreement between and within the subjects. The following are the
null and alternative hypothesis for the model usability.

–
1

H0: The p-value provides the likelihood of obtaining the sample, with its
Kendall’s coefficient, agreement within subject is due to chance.

–

H1: The p-value provides the likelihood of obtaining the sample, with its
Kendall’s coefficient, agreement within subject is not due to chance.

111

For a 95% CI, the alpha level is equal to 0.05. Figure 32 shows the p-value for all the
subjects is 0.1353. If the p-value is less than or equal to a predetermined level of significance
(alpha level), reject the null hypothesis and support the alternative hypothesis. Because the pvalues are greater than the alpha level for all subjects, accept the null hypothesis. Therefore,
agreement within the subject is due to likelihood of sample. There is a relative agreement among
the subjects in the likelihood of falls.
Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance
Appraiser

Coef

Chi - Sq

DF

P

Subject 1

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 10

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 11

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 12

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 13

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 14

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 15

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 2

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 3

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 4

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 5

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 6

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 7

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 8

1

4

2

0.1353

Subject 9

1

4

2

0.1353

Figure 32: Kendall Coefficient of Concordance
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Descriptive Statistics
The statistical variability is data dispersion or spread in a variable or a probability
distribution. Common examples of measures of statistical dispersion are the variance, coefficient
of variation, and standard deviation. Variability or variance is no significance difference in the
data. Figure 33 is the Minitab output for the model validation. Multiple descriptive statistics for
a 95% confidence interval and t-test are the following: coefficient of variation (21.36), variance
(0.251), mean (2.34), and standard deviation (0.501). The results indicate there is minimal
variability with fuzzy AHP modeling. As result, model evaluation and validation indicates that
there is no distinction between the current accepted NASA model and developed fuzzy AHP
model.

One-Sample T test
Variable

N

Mean

StDev

SE Mean

Rating 1

90

2.3444 0.5008

Variable

N

N*

Mean

SE Mean

StDev

Rating 1

90

0

2.3444

0.0528

0.5008

Variable

Method

CI for StDev

Rating 1

Standard

(0.437, 0.587)

(0.191, 0.345)

Adjusted

(0.444, 0.574)

(0.197, 0.330)

0.0528

95% CI
(2.2396, 2.4493)

Variance
0.2508

Variance

Figure 33: Variability
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CoefVar
21.36

Minimum
2.0000

Q1
2.0000

Model Validation
Model validation is certification of conformance to a standard. There are various ways to
validate a model. Model validation was partitioned into three components: reliability, objectivity,
and consistency. Reliability is the agreement between and within the subjects. Objectivity is the
high performance for complex applications. Consistency is full agreement between the models.
Reliability is the agreement of the data such as the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance
for the fifteen test subjects when they applied the fuzzy AHP model to the three scenarios.
Objectivity is the statistical analysis such as the variance as a result of the fuzzy AHP model
application. There is minimal variability with fuzzy modeling. Consistency is similarity and
logical coherence among the Fuzzy AHP model and the NASA Accepted model.
The model was validated by comparing the fuzzy AHP model to NASA accepted model.
NASA accepted model for fall hazards is the standard for the research. The comparison involved
the comprehensive risk for falls, predicted likelihood rating, and accepted likelihood rating. The
fuzzy AHP model is confirmed valid. In addition, there is another way to validate model is to
conduct the same statistical analysis on 15 NASA SMES and then compare the results to the 15
test subjects used in this research. Table 28 shows the model validation results for the research.
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Table 28: Agreement of Data

Subject

Kendall
Coefficient

Inspected

Matched

Percentage
(%)

P-value

95% CI

Subject 1

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 2

1.00

3

2

67

.1353

(9.43, 99.16)

Subject 3

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 4

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 5

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 6

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 7

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 8

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 9

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 10

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 11

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 12

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 13

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 14

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Subject 15

1.00

3

3

100

.1353

(36.84, 100.00)

Overall

1.00
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The previous results in Table 28 show that the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance is
1.00, which indicates the outstanding high degree of agreement between and within the subjects.
Because the p-values are greater than the alpha level for all subjects, accept the null hypothesis.
Therefore, agreement within the subject is due to likelihood of sample. As a result, there is a
relative agreement among the subjects in the likelihood of falls.
Table 29: Variability

Descriptive Statistic Name

Value

Coefficient of Variation

21.36

Variance

0.251

Mean

2.34

Standard deviation

0.501

Multiple descriptive statistics were calculated for a 95% confidence interval and t-test to
measure the variability. Table 29 lists the summary of the statistical results where the variance is
0.251. Therefore, there is minimal disparity and discrepancy with the fuzzy AHP modeling.
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Table 30: Model Validation
Scenario

Comprehensive
Risk for Falls
(Y)

Fuzzy AHP model:
Predicted Likelihood
Rating

NASA/KSC
current Model:
Accepted
Likelihood
Rating

Shuttle Landing
Facility (SLF)

0.404

2

2

Launch Complex
Payloads (LCP)

0.351

2

3

Vehicle
Assembly
Building (VAB)

0.451

3

3

The results in Table 30 show there is compatibility between the fuzzy AHP and NASA
accepted model. Thus, the fuzzy AHP is in full agreement with the NASA standard.
Results/Discussion Summary
The following section is the synopsis of the results in the research. The section includes
the AHP Analysis results, range of existence results, mathematical model results, and
research hypothesis results.
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AHP Analysis Summary
The following is results summary for the AHP analysis. Table 29 lists the categorical risk
factors in the research.
Table 31: Categorical Risk Factors

Categorical Risk Factor

Relative Weight

Ranking
1

Task Related

0.314

2

Human/Personal

0.307

3

Environmental

0.248

4

Organizational

0.130

Table 30 lists the task related risk factors in the research.

Table 32: Task Related Risk Factors

Categorical Risk Factor

Relative Weight

Ranking
1

Task Frequency

0.451

2

Task Proximity

0.381

3

Task Duration

0.168
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Table 31 lists the environmental risk factors in the research.
Table 33: Environmental Risk Factors
Environmental Risk Factor

Relative Weight

Ranking
1

Environmental Surface

0.422

2

Environmental Condition

0.298

3

Fall Distance

0.279

Table 32 lists the human/personal risk factors in the research.

Table 34: Human/Personal Risk factors

Human/Personal Risk Factor

Relative Weight

Ranking
1

Worker Interference

0.528

2

Number of Workers

0.263

3

Age

0.209
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Table 33 lists the organizational risk factors in the research.
Table 35: Organizational Risk Factors
Organizational Risk Factor

Relative Weight

Ranking
1

Fall Hazard Occurrence

0.356

2

Fall Hazard Protection

0.354

3

Fall Hazard Severity

0.289

Table 34 lists the ranges of existence for each risk factor according to the category.
Table 36: Ranges of Existence Summary
Linguistic Variable

Task Related

Human

Environmental

Organizational

High

0.67-1.00

0.67-1.00

0.67-1.00

0.67-1.00

Medium

0.34-0.66

0.34-0.66

0.34-0.66

0.34-0.66

Low

0-0.33

0-0.33

0-0.33

0-0.33
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Mathematical Model Summary
The aggregate risk level is determined by applying the following fuzzy AHP model in
any organization or case. After the linguistic risk and the relative significance are generated an
aggregated numeric value is obtainable. The fuzzy quantification linear models were used in the
research.
Research Hypothesis Results
The following are the research hypotheses for this study. Both null hypotheses were
accepted and not rejected.
H0: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors can be useful
1

in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations
H1: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors cannot be
useful in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations

H0: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model can be developed and validated to
2

predict the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
H1: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model cannot be developed and validated to
predict the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.
The research hypotheses were validated by conceptual model, mathematical model, and
the statistical analysis results. The research findings indicated that having cognizance of risk
factors that lead to falls is beneficial and could prevent the likelihoods of falls in NASA Ground
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Support Operations. A fuzzy AHP model was developed and validated in the research. The
results from the fuzzy AHP model were compared and confirmed with the NASA accepted scale
for the prediction of fall hazards.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION
The research is consistent with prior literature; which states there are multiple risk
factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Operations. Falls remain a significant
problem in an occupational environment. The current literature reviews numerous risk factors
that lead to falls in the workplace. These factors can be categorized broadly as environmental,
risk, organizational, human/personal, and task-related. Current measures to reduce falls focus
mainly on fall protection procedures, such as the use of covers, guard rails, safety nets, safe
monitoring systems, etc. But these procedures are not practical for all organizations. However,
future research on preventing falls in an industrial environment such should consider the main
effects and the interaction of factors that affect the balance control of the worker. Ultimately,
safety should be the number one priority of any organization.
Research Gaps Addressed
There are research needs in field of fall mitigation. The following are the gaps indicated in the
literature.
•

Knowledge and understanding of contributing risk factors that influence falls in NASA
Ground Support Operations ((Hongwei Hsiao, 2008; Petre Simeonova, 2001)
The previous gap was filled by identified and classifying the recurring and significant
risk factors that contribute to falls in a general work environment and an aerospace work
environment.

•

Aggregate impact and interactive nature of risk factors that influence falls (Gauchard, G.,
2001)
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The previous gap is a growing process. A step in progression was made by developing a
conceptual model based on a theoretical basis from previous studies to understand the
comprehensive influence of risk factors on falls.
•

Model that quantifies risk factors that influence falls in an aerospace environment and
specifically NASA Ground Support Operations (Dagdeviren, M., 2008)
The gap was filled by developing and validating a fuzzy analytical hierarchy process
model to predict the likelihood of falls in an aerospace environment (NASA ground
support operations) and assist in the task and work design.
Research Questions Addressed

There are research questions that were addressed in the research. The following are the research
questions from this study.
•

What are the contributing risk factors that influence falls in the workplace?
The multiple risk factors that lead to falls can be generally categorized in the areas of task
related, human/personal, environmental, and organizational.

•

How do we quantify contributing risk factors that influence falls in NASA ground
support operations? The rationale in the research was to develop and validate a model
that represents linguistic variables to quantify and rank risk factors that contribute to falls.
The variables were quantified using fuzzy set theory. As a result, the model will evaluate
qualitative and quantitative data.

•

What is the aggregate risk value of these risk factors on falls?
The total effect or the aggregate risk value of the risk factors that lead to falls was the
comprehensive risk in the fuzzy AHP model.
124

•

How we will predict the likelihood of falls?
The likelihood of falls was predicted by using the aggregate risk value and likelihood
rating for the falls in an aerospace environment such as NASA Ground Support
Operations.
Research Limitations
Fall is preventable by multidimensional assessment and targeted intervention. The

limitations in the study are not considering the interaction of risk factors in the model that
contribute to falls or the global weights of risk factors. The model local weights for the risk
factors were used in the research. However, the global weights the model were analyzed. The
global weights indicate how the risk factors compare against each other in the whole model.
Model Importance and Applications
It is imperative to understand the cause of the problem in order to prevent the effect. The
cause in this model was the risk factor and fall was the effect. A model is not the real world but
merely a human development to assist in understanding real world systems. The key features in
the model were: assumptions simplified, boundary conditions identified, and applicability of the
model understood. The conceptual model is a qualitative model that assists emphasize important
connections in real world systems and processes. This is first step in the development of more
complex models. The Fuzzy AHP model is a quantitative model that involves solving relevant
equations of a system or characterizing a system. This fuzzy AHP model is innovative method
for evaluating a problem and specifically falls. This is a step towards fall mitigation and
prevention and can be applied to any work environment with regards to falls.
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Research Contribution
The fuzzy AHP model was developed and validated by quantifying the risk factors that lead to
falls in NASA Ground Support Operations. The multifaceted model is ergonomically and
mathematically sound; which can be applied in any work environment. The purpose of the
research was to establish another technique to predict and prevent falls in NASA Ground Support
Operations. The research will be a great contribution to the prevention of falls and to the NASA
Safety program. The model will aid in risk assessment, assist in task design, and fall prevention.
It is recommended to use the model in NASA Fall Protection training and Risk Management.
The fuzzy AHP model is addition to the body of knowledge in field. For instance, there are
hazard analysis, failure mode analysis, physiological assessments, and risk analysis on falls in
the literature. However, the fuzzy AHP model can be applied to a Human Performance
Assessment, Biomechanics, and Athletic Training. For example, to assess the risks in athletic
training, there is need for understanding, identifying, and quantifying the risk factors that may
lead to a hazard during that period. Therefore, the fatalities and personal injuries will be
prevented. The contribution is the utilization of the valid fuzzy AHP model to predict the
likelihood of falls. The fuzzy AHP model is numerical, quantifiable, and it has granularity.
Granularity is distribution of parts in a comprehensive approach that has been uniformly exposed
and processed. The fuzzy AHP model is a numerical model. The model also gives insight of the
risk associated with the fall. The fuzzy AHP model is intuitive because it provides understanding
based on identification of relationships and behaviors. For example, the aggregate risk value of
0.69 in the model indicates a high linguistic variable, high risk where falls are highly likely to
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occur, and a likelihood rating of 4. Controls have significant uncertainties. This is a tool that can
be applied to any organization. The benefit of this research is the application of the model for a
safety engineering management class. Lastly, this research effort provides, tools, systems, methods,
and techniques to measure and assess falls in an aerospace environment such as the NASA Expert
Choice voting system, creation of priority vectors, taxonomy development, fall hazard assessment,
and the fall risk factors survey. The research produced a reliable fuzzy AHP model that is prepared to
be benchmarked by other organizations.
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CHAPTER VI: RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH

After completing the research and reviewing literature on falls, here are the following
recommendations:
Management
•

Establish and implement procedures that significantly reduce the number injuries and
deaths due to falls.

•

Conduct regular inspections of working and walking surfaces to identify hazards that
could lead to slips, trips, and falls followed by immediate corrective action to avoid
recurring incidents as indicated in the schematic diagram for the fuzzy AHP model.

•

Implement extensive fall protection training or risk management course

•

Establish a NASA online course in Satern (Training website) for fall prevention.

•

Hold all employees especially high risk areas for falls accountable to take the previous
training and course annually.

Employee
•

Every employee in NASA Ground Supports Operations and specifically in those areas for
the fall hazard concerns should to take the training/course annually.
It is recommended to use the model in this study to predict the likelihood of falls in an

aerospace environment and provide recommendations for fall abatement. The table displays the
objective or goal and the method of corrective action. For example, objective C is to reduce
energy levels. One of the major future goals is to Go green and optimize energy performance. It
was observed in the NASA Ground Support Operations, that majority of the work areas had a
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fall distance of over 100 ft.; which is considered high. This is a fall hazard and may lead to falls.
The following tables are recommended protection methods that can prevent falls and injuries.
As result, using safety measures and protection methods can ultimately save your life.

Table 37: Protection Methods
(Bauer, 2006)
OBJECTIVE

METHOD

A. Prevent falls of people

1. Remove tripping and slipping hazards
2. Protect edges and openings
a. Provide barriers (guardrails, covers, cage, etc.
b. Proved visual and auditory warnings

B. Prevent objects from falling on people

3. Provide grab bars, handrails, and handholds
4. Provide fall-limiting equipment
1. Housekeeping (remove objects that could fall)
2. Barrier (ice boards, guardrail, infill, covers, etc.
3. Proper stacking and placement
4. Fall zone
5. Overheard protection

C. Reduce energy levels

1. Reduce fall distances

D. Reduce injuries from falls and impact

2. Reduce weight of falling objects
3. Control fall deceleration
1. Increase area of impact force
2. Increase energy absorption distance
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Future Research

The following section is the proposed future research after completing this dissertation.
Some of the proposed future research includes compare and contrasting other fall prediction
models to the Fuzzy AHP model in this study, developing a cost and benefit analysis for fall
simulated training module vs. fall protection training course. Another future research activity
is to develop a statistical model using stepwise regression on the most current BLS Data (e.g.
BLS 2007-2008) and observed if there are any other trends in the data. Once of the
limitations of this research was evaluating the interaction of multiple risk factors that
contribute to falls. In addition, future research includes increasing the number of risk factors
in the model to show the interactive nature of other risk factors that contribute to falls.
However, it is essential to recognize and comprehend the interactive nature of risk factors
that contribute to in order to mitigate falls.
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